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Article

United States Competition Policy in
Crisis: 1890–1955
Herbert Hovenkamp†
INTRODUCTION:
HISTORICAL EXPLANATION AND THE MARGINALIST
REVOLUTION
The history of legal policy toward the economy in the United
States has emphasized interest group clashes that led to regulatory legislation.1 This is also true of the history of competition
policy.2 Many historians see regulatory history as little more than
a political process in which well-organized, dominant interest
groups obtain political advantage and protect their particular industry from competition, typically at the expense of consumers.3
† Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.
Thanks to Christina Bohannan for commenting on a draft. Copyright © 2009
by Herbert Hovenkamp.
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 83–84 (1996); THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 12–22 (Claudia Goldin &
Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994); Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation History as Politics
or Markets, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 549 (1995) (reviewing THE REGULATED
ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra).
2. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION, 40–41 (2005); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective, 5 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 73, 74 (1985); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-Examined, 30
ECON. INQUIRY 263, 267 (1992); Fred S. McChesney, Be True to Your School: Chicago’s Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 323, 331 (Fred S.
McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995) (noting that interest group pressures explain much of the Sherman Antitrust Act); George J. Stigler, The Origin
of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1985).
3. See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877–1916, at 3
(1965); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211, 212 (1976) (developing a theoretical model to explain the “producer
protection” view); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 809–21 (1975) (presenting a model of social costs of
monopoly and monopoly-inducing regulation).
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But clearly there must be more to this story. Interest group
politics cannot explain all aspects of our regulatory past. For example, in almost every state, electricity and natural gas historically have been delivered to retail customers by monopoly franchises at regulated prices.4 By contrast, in every state, groceries,
shoes, and lumber were sold in competitive markets with no regulation of price, output, or service territory, except for a few brief
periods of extremist flirtation.5 It would be silly to conclude that
these results were obtained uniformly in so many markets simply
because the interest groups backing the electricity and natural
gas industries were better organized than were the purveyors of
groceries, shoes, or lumber. In fact, policymaking in these situations was heavily driven by theory.6 At the same time, interest
group pressures in a complex democracy cannot be ignored, particularly in a political regime such as that of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, when fundamental changes in
technology and corporate structure were causing many displacements of older small businesses with newer, larger ones.7 During
this period the large business firm that operates in many states
came into existence. Productive efficiencies that resulted from
industrialization led to rapid but volatile economic growth, extreme speculation, and then the Great Depression and the
eventual rise of the regulatory state.8
This Article argues that government policy toward competition is not inevitably driven by special interests but rather is
a complex product of theory and interest group pressure. When
economic theory is robust and widely held, as was the competition model of the classical political economists, then the theory
serves to centralize political power and to squelch specialinterest dissenters. In these cases, theory and politics converge.
However, if the theory is controversial, if it contains significant
gaps, or if many features of it are poorly understood, then interest group pressures become more prominent and tend to determine government policy. This perspective on regulation appreciates the merits of economic ideas more than does much of
the writing in both economic history and public choice theory.
4. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business
Firm: 1880–1960, at 4 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 08-40,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1268328.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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This model applies today as much as in our past. For example, in the law of intellectual property we lack a robust consensus
on such fundamental questions as what the duration or scope of
an intellectual property right should be, or what the relationship
is between patent and copyright protection and incentives to innovate.9 The result is that the Patent and Copyright Acts are a
mélange of special interest provisions that gives an observer little
confidence that the incentive to innovate is what the Acts are all
about.10 In contrast, by the 1970s the economic models for competition produced broad, although hardly unanimous, consensus
among neoclassical economists.11 This is reflected in a set of modern antitrust provisions that is relatively simple and interestgroup neutral at its core.12
This thesis can help explain the unprecedented level of fumbling, experimentation, and interest group activity that characterized United States competition policy during the marginalist
revolution in economics, which began in the late nineteenth century and lasted for decades. Part I of this Article provides an
overview of the marginalist revolution that displaced the classical
understanding of industrial economics in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Next, Part II explores Progressive Era
social-control theories as they were applied in industrial economics, the vexing problem of fixed costs, which were seen as an increasingly common attribute of industry but which did not fit
well into the prevailing models of competition, and the impact of
these developments on competition policy. Part III examines the
imperfect resolution of the fixed-costs problem provided by the
9. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual
Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2189, 2189 (2000) (noting the common
criticism that intellectual property law is “out-of-date, overwhelmed by the new
technology of the day, and in need of a radical makeover”).
10. See id. at 2233 (arguing that a lack of legislative consistency leads to litigation over patent issues that slows innovation); see also Christina Bohannan,
Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 568 (2006) (“As a result
of special-interest capture, the Copyright Act confers overly broad rights to copyright owners at the expense of the public interest in having access to creative
works.”); Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Errands into the Wilderness, 50 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at
1), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1377382
(“[P]atent and copyright law have lost their focus on facilitating the type and
amount of innovation needed to benefit consumers, and turned toward the protection of rights holders.”).
11. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶¶ 100–01 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that current antitrust laws support the general goal of competition of performance).
12. Id.
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imperfect competition and monopolistic competition models in the
1930s. Part IV looks at how these models affected competition
policy, and particularly, how they encouraged much greater antitrust intervention. Part V then documents the rise of structuralism in postwar competition theory, particularly the structureconduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm, which was one of the
most important competition models in the history of economic
policy, but is today largely discredited. Part VI comments on the
decline of the structural paradigm and the rise of the Chicago
School, which deemphasized both the importance of structure
and the opportunities for anticompetitive behavior.
I. THE MARGINALIST REVOLUTION
Marginalism substituted the forward-looking concepts of
marginal utility, marginal revenue, and marginal cost in place of
the historical averages used by classical political economists to
explain economic behavior.13 This neoclassical revolution interrupted a period of relatively stable and largely benign thinking
about competition and revolutionized industrial economics in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.14 While the classicists were somewhat preoccupied with monopoly in land, in manufacturing they tended to see either competition or monopoly, and
monopoly was regarded as exceptional.15 The marginalist model
threatened that vision by developing mathematical models that
divided markets into degrees of competitiveness.16 This further
led to a search for the specifications of a perfectly competitive
market and the developing intuition that such markets were in
fact quite rare.
A. THE LEGACY OF CLASSICISM AND COURNOT
Classical political economy had the distinct advantage of not
being technical. Expectations for mathematical precision were
not particularly high. If they were writing today, the classical po13. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 2.
14. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership
and Control, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 4), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1315003; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Corporate Finance: 1880–1965, at 1 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 08-29, 2008), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1141291.
15. See generally MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT chs. 8–
11, 15 (4th ed. 1985) (chronicling the transition from neoclassicism to the marginal revolution).
16. See id.

2009]

COMPETITION POLICY IN CRISIS

315

litical economists would be regarded as public intellectuals writing about policy. “Competition” most typically referred to the rivalry that existed among two or more businesspersons.17 For example, Adam Smith distinguished between competition and
collusion and realized that rivals must be sufficiently numerous
so as to make collusion unlikely.18 He knew that competition required actors who were knowledgeable about market conditions
and had the freedom to act upon this knowledge, and required
that resources be mobile.19 But Smith and other classicists had at
best a vaguely formulated concept of the relationship between
competitive prices and cost. Further, the English classicists had
very little conception of “degrees” of competition. Markets were
either competitive or else they were monopolized.20 Augustin
Cournot, writing in France in the 1830s and largely ignored for a
half century, attempted to quantify the relationship between
marginal production and costs, and related the number of firms
in a market to the market price.21 But only with the rise of marginalism did Cournot’s work come into vogue in England and later in the United States.22
With the exception of Cournot, the classicists rarely used
mathematics. Both W. Stanley Jevons and Léon Walras began to
use some math in the 1870s, and Jevons acknowledged Cournot’s
influence.23 Alfred Marshall also acknowledged Cournot in his
17. See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65
J. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (1957) (citing ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 56–57 (Edward Cannan ed., Modern Library 1937) (1776)).
18. See id. at 2 (noting Smith’s observations on the influence of the number of economic rivals in competition).
19. See id. (listing Smith’s five conditions of competition).
20. See id. at 5 (“[T]he most striking deficiency of the classical economists
was their failure to work out the theory of the effects of competition on the distribution of income.”).
21. See Irving Fisher, Introduction to AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RECHERCHES
SUR LES PRINCIPES MATHÉMATIQUES DE LA THÉORIE DES RICHESSES [RESEARCHES
INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH] ix, ix–xii (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus M. Kelley 1960) (1838) (discussing the life and
work of Cournot).
22. See generally Martik Shubik, Cournot, Antoine Augustin, in 1 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 708, 708–12 (John Eatwell et al. eds.,
1987).
23. See, e.g., W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 3,
85 n.1 (5th ed., Augustus M. Kelley 1965) (1871) (discussing the mathematical
character of economics and reflecting on Cournot’s work); LÉON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS 83–91 (William Jaffé trans., George Allen & Unwin
Ltd. 1954) (1874) (developing a mathematical theory for the market and competition).
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1890 Principles of Economics.24 While Cournot did not use the
term “marginal cost,” his mathematical formulations for competition used a term defined as the rate of increase in per-unit costs,
which is the same thing.25 Cournot also showed that the intersection of a declining demand curve and an increasing marginal cost
curve determined how much a competitive firm would produce
and, indirectly, the price it would charge.26 He then theorized
that if each firm in a market with relatively few sellers computed
this profit-maximizing rate of output on the assumption that rivals would hold their outputs constant, the market would reach
an equilibrium in which output was lower than the competitive
level, but not so low as the single firm monopoly level.27 This
highly elegant mathematical model—the first theory of oligopoly—was responsible for much of the marginalist theorizing about
competition early in the twentieth century.
Cournot’s model was widely regarded as excessively simplistic, for a number of reasons. First, the theory that each firm
would set its own output on the assumption that other firms
would hold their output constant was counterintuitive.28 In addition, Cournot assumed a perfectly fungible product—that is, that
the output of different producers was so nearly identical that consumers were indifferent to everything except price.29 He also assumed that firms were indifferent to the potential for market entry by other firms, and he paid almost no attention to the
presence of fixed as opposed to variable costs.30 In sum, while

24. See ALFRED MARSHALL, 2 PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 35, 36 (8th ed.
MacMillan & Co. 1925) (1890) (discussing how Cournot influenced his works).
25. Irving Fisher, Cournot and Mathematical Economics, 12 Q.J. ECON. 119,
127 (1898).
26. See id. (crediting Cournot for developing the supply and demand curves).
27. See, e.g., id. at 128 (reviewing Cournot’s analysis of the effect of copper
and zinc monopolies on the price of brass).
28. The most influential, and very hostile, critique came from Joseph Bertrand, who illustrated that if one adopted price instead of output as the relative
variable, the firms in Cournot’s model would set the competitive price for any
number of firms greater than one. See Joseph Bertrand, Théorie Mathématique de
la Richesse Sociale, 67 J. DES SAVANTS 499, 499–508 (1883). For a good historical
discussion, see Jean Magnan de Bornier, The “Cournot-Bertrand Debate”: A Historical Perspective, 24 HIST. POL. ECON. 623, 623–55 (1992).
29. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 917, 919–20 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2001))
(examining the assumptions made in the Cournot model).
30. See id. at 920 (“Although factors like high fixed costs, scale economies,
and product differentiation are certainly complications, these factors are all structural.”).
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Cournot’s theory supplied the core of marginalist competition
analysis, many details had to be worked out.
Nevertheless, Cournot’s overly simplistic assumptions actually account for his theory’s durability, as well as the centrality
of his model to the marginalists’ debate over competition policy.
Much of that debate concerned what occurs when you relax one
or more of Cournot’s simple assumptions, by considering such
things as high fixed costs, product differentiation, or entry barriers.
B. NEOCLASSICISM AND THE INTRODUCTION OF MARGINALISM
Marginalism led to a number of puzzles that had to be
worked out before the classical theory of competitive equilibrium
could be reformulated to accommodate marginalist assumptions.
An economic equilibrium is a steady state such that no market
participant has an incentive to change unless some effect from
outside the market occurs.31 Unless constrained, an economy that
is not in equilibrium tends to move toward one, while an economy
in equilibrium tends to stay there.32 The classical political economists generally gave little thought to the conditions necessary
for equilibrium. The notable exception was David Ricardo, who
believed that the economy always headed toward a steady state
in which labor and marginal land earned minimum sustainable
incomes, while superior land permanently captured higher profits, or rents.33 Even the great Cambridge University economist
Alfred Marshall, whose Principles of Economics was both marginalist and much more entrepreneurial than Ricardo’s work, focused on the manufacturing economy’s two simplest equilibria—
perfect competition and monopoly—and gave very little thought
to anything in between.34
As Joseph Schumpeter observed in the 1930s, the purpose of
equilibrium analysis in economics is to allow policymakers to
31. See, e.g., JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION
92–94 (1938) (discussing competitive equilibrium).
32. See, e.g., id.
33. See DAVID RICARDO, AN ESSAY ON THE INFLUENCE OF A LOW PRICE OF
CORN ON THE PROFITS OF STOCK (1815), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 4 –6 (Piero Sraffa ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1962) (discussing the relationship between the value of land and its fertility). See
generally MICHIO MORISHIMA, RICARDO’S ECONOMICS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH 5–8 (1989); H. Barkai, Ricardo’s Static
Equilibrium, 32 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 15, 15–31 (1965) (analyzing the Ricardian
theoretical framework).
34. See generally MARSHALL, supra note 24, at 36–38.
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analyze the causes of “chronic disequilibria.”35 But if this is so,
Schumpeter concluded, the geometry of marginalism, with its
curves that shift depending on one’s assumptions, cannot remain
an academic curiosity.36 Problematically, however, in the vast
range between perfect competition and absolute monopoly lies
much unknown territory.
[A]s soon as we realize the implications of imperfect competition all
presumption vanishes for some of those effects to emerge which we
used to attribute to the normal working of an economic society which
in common parlance would still be called “competitive.” Our theorems
about maximum satisfaction or maximum national dividend cease to
hold true and the list of cases in which collective political action can
increase both of them becomes so extended as to make these cases the
rule rather than more or less curious exceptions.37

The post-Marshall development of neoclassical economics,
with its mathematics of incentives at the margin, permitted an
infinite array of alternatives to competition and monopoly. In
particular, the development of imperfect competition and oligopoly theory led to the realization that in many markets at least one
equilibrium existed in which prices were significantly above the
competitive level, plants had too much unused capacity, and
product differentiation was significant. In her pathbreaking early
1930s neoclassical study of price theory, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, Marshall’s student Joan Robinson noted that
while traditionally economists had treated competition as the
norm and monopoly as a special case, marginalist analysis
showed that “it is more proper to set out the analysis of monopoly, treating perfect competition as a special case.”38 The developing concept of entry barriers, or prices that might not be disciplined by new competition, made the policy implications of these
conclusions even more ominous. Further, in the earlier models,
particularly those of Marshall and Robinson, profits tended to
flow toward capital at the expense of labor—a point that is made
repeatedly in Progressive Era policy literature.39 In sum, for
35. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition,
42 J. POL. ECON. 249, 256 (1934).
36. See id. (“Certain kinds of shifts are amenable to rule or law and can be
handled with relative ease just as movements along a curve, and this means
that we must build the economic cycle into our general theory.”).
37. Id. at 250–51.
38. ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 307.
39. See, e.g., J. H. Hollander, Political Economy and the Labor Question,
176 N. AM. REV. 563, 565–66 (1903) (noting that “[c]apital took on a new importance” for the English political economists developing the wage fund
theory). But see Francis A. Walker, The Doctrine of Rent, and the Residual
Claimant Theory of Wages, 5 Q.J. ECON. 417, 420–22 (1891) (refuting the ar-
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quite some time, marginalism brought to an end the notion that
pure competition or something close to it was the norm, with monopoly as an occasional exception. Market imperfections seemed
to exist everywhere.
The new economics also began to focus on the structure of
business organizations. Perhaps by coincidence, the rise of marginalist economic theory occurred simultaneously with the rise of
the large business enterprise. When Adam Smith surveyed the
economic landscape he saw a world of farmers, blacksmiths, cobblers, and bakers, mainly small enterprises with low initial investment, significant mobility, and little product differentiation
other than a particular tradesman’s reputation for quality.40 But
writing in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Joan Robinson and
Edward Chamberlin saw an economic world dominated much
more prominently by large firms with significant fixed-cost investments in specialized equipment, differentiated products, and
excess capacity.41
The emergent theory of the firm contained two strands. First
was a marginalist strand, which found numerous imperfections
until the technical details of the neoclassical model of industrial
organization were worked out.42 Second was a Darwinian “institutionalist” strand, which was much more empirical, but was
equally prone to view the large business firm with suspicion. Although it was ignored for decades, Ronald Coase’s famous article,
The Nature of the Firm, was eventually interpreted as merging
these two strands by combining empirical study with a theory of
relative costs of intra-firm versus market procurement.43
In the marginalist conception of a perfectly competitive economy, prices are driven to marginal cost and the industry as a
whole produces at the most efficient rate possible. While these
gument of the inverse relationship between capital and labor with respect to
the “residual” theory of wages).
40. See generally SMITH, supra note 17, at 1–10.
41. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. See generally EDWARD
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 1–16 (3d ed. 1939);
ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 92–94.
42. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 3 (“The marginalist crisis in competition policy did not find a satisfactory solution until the middle of the twentieth century. Because markets are populated by firms, the principal actors in
this crisis were business corporations. Economists in the first half of the twentieth century probed the firm’s nature, structure, motives and extent of operations at an unprecedented level.”).
43. For more information on Coase’s work, which developed an economic
definition of a firm and a theory of moving equilibrium, see R. H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 404 –05 (1937).
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conclusions largely tracked the much less technical formulations
of “pure” competition in classical political economy,44 there was
one important difference. The classicists generally believed that
competition was the norm except when government intervened.45
By contrast, the initial impact of marginalist analysis was the belief that competition was exceptional.46 Fixed costs and scale
economies dictated that firms could not price at the competitive
level. Under the economic theories of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such firms would be driven to overproduction and “ruinous competition” as prices would be forced so low
that they could not cover a firm’s fixed-cost investments.47 In the
1930s, however, new models that incorporated product differentiation largely solved the ruinous competition problem.48 Product
differentiation served to limit firms’ competition with one another
even when they were in the same general market. But competition in product-differentiated markets was hardly perfect either:
instead of overproduction, firms in such markets tended to have
excess capacity and to invest too much in product design and advertising.49 Oligopoly theory exacerbated the problem by theorizing even poorer performance when the number of firms was small
and entry barriers were high.50
C.

CONSEQUENCES OF MARGINALISM FOR ANTITRUST POLICY

The policy consequences of these developments in economic
theory were significant. For many economists during the early
part of the century, high fixed costs dictated that almost any
44. The conclusions mainly tracked the works of Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, Naussau Senior, and John Stuart Mill.
45. See, e.g., BLAUG, supra note 15, at 594 (examining Adam Smith’s
theory on competition).
46. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 3 (“The rise of marginalist economics . . . led to . . . the developing intuition that [perfectly competitive] markets were quite rare.”).
47. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 311 (discussing Arthur Twining Hadley’s theory of ruinous competition).
48. Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 48 (“The switch from industrial theories involving fixed costs and fungible products to those based on product differentiation very largely explains the abrupt switch in antitrust policy that
occurred during the Roosevelt Administration.”).
49. Cf. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937,
at 338 (1991) (discussing similar fears related to vertical integration in the
1930s).
50. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 49 (“[E]conomists feared the
move from monopolistic competition, where new entry was generally presumed to be easy, to oligopoly, which had all the evils of excessive product differentiation but high entry barriers and higher prices as well.”).
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amount of antitrust regulation was excessive.51 They believed
that dominant firms and cooperation were inherent features of
the industrial landscape.52 Any attempt by government to suppress them would result in higher costs at best, or complete loss
of market stability at worst.53 This economic model was coming
into vogue in 1890, when the Sherman Act was passed, and helps
explain why so many economists opposed antitrust legislation.54
At the opposite extreme, the product differentiation models of the
1930s were seen as leading to underproduction, excess capacity,
and too much investment in product differentiation and advertising.55 High entry barriers and oligopoly concentration greatly exacerbated the problem.56 In such a regime, antitrust readily
found an important place.
In 1940, Columbia University economist John Maurice
Clark, the most pragmatic theoretician of mid-century competition policy, thrust a consensus-forming paper into this mix—his
essay on “workable competition.”57 Clark’s paper, which was to
have a powerful influence on antitrust policy, argued that although the observed imperfections were real, their impact had
been exaggerated.58 In reality, government policymakers could
identify and enforce a degree of competition that was functionally
adequate, particularly when compared with the available regulatory alternatives.59
The “workable competition” model served to make the case
for antitrust as the principal regulator of competition in the
51. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 309 (1991) (“If forced to compete,
firms in these industries would naturally be driven to ruin. The principal cause of
this ‘ruinous competition’ was the presence of high fixed costs.”).
52. See id. at 310 (“John Bates Clark argued in 1887 that certain industries were so prone to overproduction that the firms in them must either collude or face ‘widespread ruin.’”).
53. Id. at 309.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
56. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 338 (noting that firms in oligopoly
markets engaged in “extreme product differentiation and carried abundant
excess capacity”).
57. See J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM.
ECON. REV. 241, 241–46 (1940). Clark was at the University of Chicago from 1915
to 1926, and at Columbia from 1926 until his retirement in 1957. For general information on Clark, see LAURENCE SHUTE, JOHN MAURICE CLARK: A SOCIAL
ECONOMICS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1997).
58. Clark, supra note 57, at 243.
59. See id. at 256 (“[O]ne may hope that government need not assume the
burden of doing something about every departure from the model of perfect
competition.”).
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United States, and to preserve a relatively small domain for government agency command-and-control regulation. Important details had to be resolved, however, and a significant debate ensued
in the 1950s between Harvard “structuralism” and a more behaviorist alternative developed mainly at the University of Chicago.60
II. PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE PROBLEM
OF FIXED COSTS
Emergent social science in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was heavily concerned with “social control.”
The idea was that society, acting through both public and private
orderings, tended to normalize and limit the excesses of individual behavior.61 The fundamental idea of social control, sociologist
Edward Alsworth Ross wrote in his pathbreaking 1901 book of
that title, was that individual and social interests were fundamentally in conflict.62 This observation itself was a sharp break
with a classical past that had tended to see individual desires,
though hedonistic, as melding together to form the social interest.
This accounted for the classical theory of markets, where the selfish desires of individuals united for the common good via voluntary exchange.63
For marginalists such as Ross, social control was not limited
to absolute coercion but rather took the form of any set of social
or government incentives that influenced individuals to do something that they might not do if unconstrained.64 Indeed, one of
the most important policy contributions of marginalism outside of
price theory was its notion that coercion is always a matter of degree, and that utility-maximizing actors equate alternative
sources of pain or pleasure just as they equate the utilities of desirable goods. This theme came to dominate social science
through the legal realists, including the writings of such early
realists as Robert Hale, who studied the manifold ways that the
60. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 31–38 (comparing and
contrasting the Harvard School with the Chicago School).
61. See generally EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, SOCIAL CONTROL 1–6 (MacMillan, 1926) (1901).
62. See id. at 441–42 (noting the clash between the “Strong Man” and society).
63. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 273 (noting Francis Walker’s definition of competition as “the operation of individual self-interest” where “each
man is acting for himself solely”).
64. See, e.g, id. at 429 (“The control of the person’s will by precept or example
is, therefore, preferable to the control of it by the employment of sanctions.”).
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legal system operated to coerce behavior and transfer wealth
without the use of absolute force.65 Further, Hale argued, this
had always been the case, even under professed systems of laissez faire that regarded the state as uninvolved with economic
life.66
The ideological origins of the social control idea and the reasons for its great popularity are somewhat ambiguous. Clearly,
its proponents doubted the long-held faith in American exceptionalism, with its belief that America was different and that God
would always keep it and its citizens on the right course.67 Social
control was about the need for society and not merely religion to
control deviant social behavior. “Deviance” was typically defined
from the perspective of the middle and upper middle class academics who became America’s first social scientists. Control devices were seen as necessary to restrain the immorality and unproductive behavior of the poor, uneducated, and minority races.
Importantly, however, they were also needed to contain the profligacy of the super-rich and rapacious.68
In the mid-twenties John Maurice Clark wrote a lengthy
book on social control of business behavior.69 That book set the
stage for Clark’s much more influential work on administratively
workable competition.70 For Clark, the problem of government
restraints on business behavior was simply a variation on the
general social problem of controlling deviancy by reference to
some articulated norm. He adopted the Ricardian notion, popular
with the Progressives, that the common law is biased because it
tends to bleed resources in the direction of those who already
have economic power.71 While he began with a wholesale indict65. See generally BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ
FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 2–28
(1998) (detailing the life and legal theories of Robert Hale).
66. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly NonCoercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923) (“[T]he systems advocated by professed upholders of laissez-faire are in reality permeated with coercive restrictions of individual freedom . . . .”).
67. Cf. Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science 253–56
(1991).
68. For an excellent discussion of control devices, see id. at 219–56 (1991).
69. JOHN MAURICE CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1926).
70. Clark, supra note 57, at 241–46. See generally discussion infra Part IV.A
(exploring Clark’s ideas put forth in the essay).
71. See CLARK, supra note 69, at 10 (describing the development of the English “law merchant,” which in Clark’s estimation was well-suited to construing
contracts between traders fairly, but was strongly biased in favor of traders when
they contracted with members of other classes). For the most forceful Progressive
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ment of the traditional system of private property and contract
rights, Clark also found significant that inefficiencies resulted
from public ownership of the means of production.72 He concluded
that the best way to guarantee the public interest in a healthy
economy and low prices was private ownership with a mixture of
regulatory and competition-enhancing legal rules.73
The development of a theory of costs was one of marginalism’s most significant contributions to industrial economics, but
early on the theory also created its most imposing problems. The
classical political economists had only the vaguest notion about
the relation between costs and different levels of output. Marginalism changed that by developing mathematical concepts of
fixed, variable, and marginal costs. In his Principles of Economics, Marshall had already noted that certain costs were highly
responsive to demand in a short time period, while other costs
such as those for land or durable plants or equipment were not.
As a result, in the short run, price might be quite responsive to
changes in demand because new capacity could not quickly be
brought into an industry. However, in the long run, new plants
would be built, and prices closer to the competitive level would
prevail.74 Whenever output responses lagged behind demand, in
either direction, the market price had little to do with cost. As
Marshall observed, “there is no connection between cost of reproduction and price in the case[] of food in a beleaguered city.”75
For the classicists and most early marginalists, a “cost” was
something that was incurred and paid off in a single production
cycle, such as the farmer’s seed or the baker’s flour.76 Fixed costs
were investments in land, plant, durable equipment, intellectual
exposition, see generally RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR
RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1914).
72. See CLARK, supra note 69, at 420–25 (debunking the notion that public
ownership always offers significant savings to communities and noting that headto-head comparisons of efficiency often favor the private operation of enterprises).
73. See id. at 459 (arguing that governments need not “wait passively for
the mills of supply and demand” to “grind out” economic changes, but instead
should “take the initiative” and “experiment to see how wide the range is within which the forces of supply and demand will not absolutely veto” price and
wage levels).
74. See MARSHALL, supra note 24, at 349 (“If the demand happens to be
great, the market price will rise for a time above the [normal] level; but as a result production will increase and the market price will fall . . . .”); Ragnar Frisch,
Alfred Marshall’s Theory of Value, 64 Q.J. ECON. 495, 519–24 (1950) (analyzing
and expanding Marshall’s reasoning).
75. MARSHALL, supra note 24, at 402.
76. Marshall, like Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, used the term “circulating capital” for these types of costs. See id. at 75 & n.2.

2009]

COMPETITION POLICY IN CRISIS

325

property, and other things whose life was either indefinite or else
lasted much longer than a single season of production and sale.77
An important attribute of fixed costs was that per-unit costs of
production declined as output went up, for fixed costs could be allocated over a larger output.78 For example, if the mortgage payments on a plant are $1000 per month, per-unit costs for the
plant are $100 per unit if the plant produces ten units per month,
but they are only $1 per unit if the plant produces 1000 units per
month. If variable costs are small by comparison—say, 50 cents
per unit—then a firm could earn a profit at drastically lower
prices if its output were sufficiently high.
In sum, fixed costs created production “economies of scale”
whenever per-unit costs were lower in firms that operated at high
rates of output. This fact in turn suggested that a market would
have room for fewer firms, and perhaps fewer than needed for effective competition. Economists around the turn of the twentieth
century were fairly obsessed with the problem of scale economies
and the implications for competition. Indeed, a principal reason
so many economists opposed the Sherman Act is that they believed that monopoly was more or less inevitable in many industries and that antitrust legislation would force firms to be inefficiently small.79 For example, Yale economist and later university
president Arthur Twining Hadley opposed the Sherman Act on
economic grounds, arguing that either monopoly or collusion was
necessary in industries with high fixed costs, lest they be driven
into ruinous competition and bankruptcy.80
Unlike the social control theorists in other social sciences,
Clark was not a behaviorist.81 His principles of decision making
were rooted in neoclassical price theory, which means that he assumed firms and their managers behaved so as to maximize prof77. Marshall, Smith, and Mill called these costs “fixed capital.” See id.
78. See id. at 75 (“[T]he return [on fixed capital of given durability] is
spread over a period of corresponding duration.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
79. See Henry R. Hatfield, The Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. POL. ECON. 1,
6 (1899) (“The weight of evidence . . . supported the view that the modern system
of large business establishments was the outgrowth of natural industrial evolution.”). See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 308–22 (discussing in detail
the fixed-cost controversy).
80. See ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY, ECONOMICS 294 –95 (New York, G.P.
Putnam’s Sons 1896) (discussing the crippling effect of “over-production” and
“cut-throat competition” on industries in which business “owners have invested
their capital in a form which they cannot readily change”).
81. ROSS, supra note 68, at 413 (quoting an unpublished letter from Clark to
Wesley Clair Mitchell).
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its. Working from that assumption the problems of high fixed
costs were manifold.82 First, they made marginal cost pricing—
and thus perfect competition—impossible because a marginal
cost price would not give a firm enough return to cover its fixedcost investment. Second, industries with high fixed costs would
feel constrained to keep their output very high in order to keep
per-unit costs low. Indeed, any price above the average variable
cost was profitable in the sense that it made some contribution to
fixed costs. The result was ruinous competition in which marketwide prices would be driven to marginal cost without enough left
over to cover fixed costs.83 This in turn led to a very high risk of
collusion in such markets as firms tried to avoid ruinous competition. Third, high fixed costs explained and justified many instances of price discrimination. The firm continuously tried to sell
all it could to any customer willing to pay enough to cover variable costs.84 As a result, price discrimination was not a monopoly
problem as such, but was ubiquitous in industries with high fixed
costs and not necessarily evil.85 Fourth, extreme cases of overhead costs can lead to natural monopoly. As Clark observed:
[W]here the economies of increased size remain decisive, up to the
point of absorbing the entire market, the business becomes a “natural
monopoly.” Competition is impossible or intolerably wasteful, and the
public must secure to itself as much as it can of the advantages of
large-scale efficiency (which should properly be no one’s permanent
private property) by regulation of prices and service.86

The fixed-cost controversy originated in disputes about railroad rates, where fixed costs were extremely high.87 But it quickly expanded into ordinary manufacturing. Problematically, once a
large fixed-cost asset such as a plant was built it had to be paid
for whether or not it was used. In an industry with high fixed
costs and multiple producers, fixed costs were thought to lead to
ruinous competition, which occurred when each firm kept its own
output as high as possible in order to keep costs down. The result
82. See JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD
COSTS 46–69 (1923) (exploring in detail the effects of fixed costs upon businesses).
83. See John Maurice Clark, Monopolistic Tendencies, Their Character and
Consequences, 18 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 124, 130 (1939) (“[T]he natural tendency
of [one form of competition Clark analyzed] was to drive prices to a level which,
while above ‘marginal’ cost . . . would be quite far below average cost.”).
84. On this problem in the nineteenth-century railroad industry, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1017–72 (1988).
85. CLARK, supra note 82, at 433.
86. CLARK, supra note 69, at 312.
87. See Hovenkamp, supra note 84, at 1035–44.
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was prices that were high enough to cover operating costs but insufficient to pay off the fixed-cost investment.88
The ruinous competition theory assumed that the goods being overproduced were fungible, or indistinguishable from one
seller to another. For example, Alfred Marshall’s conception of
the “representative firm” in an industry entailed that every firm
in a market had cost and production functions that were to be
counted as identical, and prices were driven to marginal cost.89
As a result, firms competed only on price and any sale above
marginal cost was profitable in the short run.
The theory of fixed costs had an influence on Progressive Era
social policy that is rarely obvious to political historians but is
nevertheless difficult to exaggerate. The theory readily migrated
from the economics of industrial organization to the welfare economics of social policy and wealth redistribution. Fixed costs explained why firms became large—because they could produce
more cheaply. It also explained overproduction—once a plant was
built, maximum output resulted in lower costs and enabled managers to bid lower prices. Importantly, however, fixed costs also
appeared to explain why wealth tended to move toward capital
rather than toward labor. First, large fixed-cost investments such
as plants had to be carried in both times of high output and low.
Labor, by contrast, was a variable cost to the capitalist and could
be dropped on a moment’s notice in times of low demand. The capitalist responding to recession could not avoid the mortgage
payments on the plant but he could readily lay workers off.
Second, while labor is a variable cost to the employer, it is in
many senses a “fixed” cost to the laborer himself. He must eat,
clothe, and shelter himself and his family whether or not he is
working, just as the plant must be paid for when it lies idle.
One of Clark’s most controversial proposals was that for social purposes the laborer be treated as a fixed rather than a vari88. See HADLEY, supra note 80, at 295.
89. See MARSHALL, supra note 74, at 317 (discussing the characteristics of a
“representative producer”). The theory was vigorously attacked as creating an
inconsistency between the assumption of fixed costs and scale economies on one
hand, and perfect competition on the other. See, e.g., Lionel Robbins, The Representative Firm, 38 ECON. J. 387, 399 (1928) (describing the concept of the “representative firm” as “not only unnecessary, but misleading”); Piero Sraffa, The
Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions, 36 ECON. J. 535, 540 (1926) (arguing that the concept “can prove a useful instrument only in regard to such exceptional industries as can reasonably satisfy its conditions”). On the birth and
death of the concept, see generally James A. Maxwell, Some Marshallian Concepts, Especially the Representative Firm, 68 ECON. J. 691, 694 –99 (1958); J.N.
Wolfe, The Representative Firm, 64 ECON. J. 337, 337–38 (1954).
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able cost—that is, as an investment whose support must be paid
for whether or not the laborer is currently employed.90 That proposal naturally had social consequences that went far beyond the
economics of industrial organization, reaching to such things as
guaranteed employment or unemployment compensation.91 Clark
himself believed that the worst evil of economic depression was
the fact that wages could instantly be withdrawn, leaving masses
of unemployed, even as the mortgage payments on plants continued to be paid.92 An additional consequence of making labor costs
variable is that it enabled the employer to avoid the full social
cost of labor, which included the costs of fatigue, injuries, and
health care.93 Once again, the owner of a plant needed to keep it
in repair in order to maintain productivity, but he could instantly
drop a sick laborer and replace him with another at little or no
cost to himself.94
By the late nineteenth century the problem of fixed costs was
already well-known in both the economics and legal literatures.95
Indeed, the notion that competition between two transportation
utilities could be ruinous was already known in the 1830s, when
litigants before the Supreme Court cited Chancellor Kent for that

90. See CLARK, supra note 82, at 384 (insisting that labor must be treated as
an overhead cost for “purposes concerned with unemployment” and that “[t]he
only question is as to the best distribution of the burden”). Clark originally made
the suggestion in a paper presented to the American Economic Association in
1920. See SHUTE, supra note 57, at 57.
91. See CLARK, supra note 82, at 411 (arguing that “more could be accomplished if the resources of private industry itself were enlisted” to ease the
burden of unemployment, and predicting that “this will be done as fast as private industry comes to feel and to bear . . . responsibility commensurate with
its powers and opportunities”).
92. See id. at 376 (attributing most of the cost of unemployment compensation to “seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in industry” and proposing
“[r]emedies for this evil”).
93. See CLARK, supra note 69, at 178 (“Thus the worker may be paid for
his actual labor, but the risks of injury, of occupational disease, or of unemployment, considered as separate costs, may not receive any compensation at
all . . . .”).
94. See id. at 157 (explaining that, because of the force of competition in labor, “[l]aborers in general are not in a position to bargain for extra pay for trade
practices which make their labor conditions unduly burdensome, unhealthy, or
dangerous”).
95. See, e.g., HADLEY, supra note 80, at 295; Henry C. Adams, Relation of the
State to Industrial Action, 1 PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. ASS’N 465, 523–28 (1887);
F.W. Taussig, A Contribution to the Theory of Railway Rates, 5 Q.J. ECON. 438,
440–41 (1891). On the fixed-cost controversy in American competition policy, see
HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 308–22.
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proposition in the Charles River Bridge case.96 Justice Story accepted it as a rationale for his dissent, which argued basically
that competition was so destructive to the business of a toll
bridge that no reasonable investor would have agreed to build
without a monopoly guarantee.97 The problem of high fixed costs
was understood sufficiently well in the railroad industry that
both railroad lawyers and the Interstate Commerce Commission
used it to justify railroad “pools,” or cartels, designed in part to
keep rates high enough to cover fixed costs.98 The Supreme Court
heard these arguments in two major antitrust cases in the late
1890s, but rejected them, holding that the Sherman Act made no
exception for industries prone to ruinous competition.99
By the turn of the century, many economists began to see the
fixed-cost problem as much more general, affecting ordinary
manufacturing as well as railroads and public utilities.100 As a
result, many came to believe that either monopoly or collusion
was virtually inevitable in many manufacturing markets unless
the state intervened. Further, antitrust intervention was not
what they had in mind, for it did no more than condemn practices
96. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 436 (1837).
97. See id. at 649–50 (Story, J., dissenting); see also W. Union Tel. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 3 F. 423, 425 (C.C.D. Kan. 1880) (noting the possibility of ruinous competition from the running of parallel telegraph lines by competing firms);
cf. Morgan v. New Orleans, M.&T.R.R. Co., 17 F. Cas. 754, 754, 758 (C.C.D. La.
1876) (No. 9804) (declining to rescind a contract dividing the market between its
signatories, two companies operating railroads and steamships, in order to limit
ruinous competition).
98. E.g., Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co., 61 F.
993, 996–97 (8th Cir. 1894) (holding that pooling is permissible if it is designed to
prevent ruinous competition, but not if its purpose is “to stifle all competition for
the purpose of raising rates”); Cent. Trust Co. v. Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 23 F. 306,
309–10 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1885) (upholding a pooling agreement), rev’d on other
grounds, 133 U.S. 83 (1890); Nashua & L.R.R. Corp. v. Boston & L.R.R. Corp., 19
F. 804, 805–06 (C.C.D. Mass. 1884) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 136 U.S. 356
(1890); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 84, at 1039–42 (discussing the rationale
for and development of pooling).
99. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 519–26, 527–33,
577 (1898) (summarizing the arguments of James Coolidge Carter for the Joint
Traffic Association and E.J. Phelps for the New York Central Railroad Company
and rejecting both); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290,
328–41 (1897) (considering in detail and ultimately rejecting the arguments of
railroad companies that Congress must have intended to exempt them from the
Sherman Act).
100. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 317 (explaining that although liberal economists continued to believe that ruinous competition would only affect industries that are natural monopolies, conservatives thought ruinous
competition could become widespread in the long run).
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that were thought to be unavoidable given the structure of American industry. During the first two decades of the twentieth century American economists debated widely whether high fixed
costs would drive business either to ruinous competition or else to
collusion.101
By the 1920s, however, a consensus began to emerge that
very high-scale economies producing truly ruinous competition
probably existed in only a few industries. The literature began to
develop important distinctions between long-run and short-run
decision making, largely in an effort to explain the great merger
movement that occurred at the turn of the twentieth century.102
The problem with the existing models of competition, wrote
Clark, was that they treated fixed costs as a given and saw competition as driving firms to ruin, earning enough to cover variable
costs but not fixed costs. However, in the long run a firm is free to
make the same choices about land, plant, and durable equipment
that it makes about inventory. To be sure, pricing and output decisions in markets with high fixed costs are more complicated because the entrepreneur must live with investment decisions over
a longer period of time. This explains such things as the great
amount of price discrimination in such markets as firms struggle
to keep their output up.103 While the consolidations were intended to diminish ruinous competition, they also made clear
that long-run pricing concerns would be a relatively permanent
feature of American manufacturing across a wide variety of markets.104 Most importantly, as developed below, the rise of compe-

101. For an overview of the debate, see id. at 302–22.
102. See, e.g., ELIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 197–
200 (1921); MYRON W. WATKINS, INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY
28–44 (Allyn A. Young ed., 1927); Eliot Jones, Is Competition in Industry Ruinous, 34 Q.J. ECON. 473, 491–97 (1920); see also 2 F.W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS 53–54 (3d ed. 1921); Spurgeon Bell, Fixed Costs and Market Price, 32
Q.J. ECON. 507, 509–22 (1918); F.H. Knight, Cost of Production and Price over
Long and Short Periods, 29 J. POL. ECON. 304, 306–10 (1921). On the merger
movement, see generally NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–1904, at 1–14 (1985); George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case,
25 J.L. & ECON. 201, 218–28 (1982); George Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy
Cause the Great Merger Wave?, 28 J.L. & ECON. 77, 77–79 (1985).
103. See F.Y. Edgeworth, 35 ECON. J. 245, 246 (1925) (reviewing CLARK, supra note 82) (noting that the “designer of a new plant” is “free to make mistakes”
like sinking too much money into it, which can greatly reduce the chances of making a profit, although price discrimination can “increase[ ] net earnings”).
104. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 102, at 317–18 (discussing the interplay between long-run prices and the tendency toward monopoly).
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tition models incorporating differentiated products largely put
the controversy to rest.105
III. IMPERFECT RESOLUTION OF THE FIXED-COSTS
CONTROVERSY IN THE 1930S: PRODUCT
DIFFERENTIATION AND MONOPOLISITIC COMPETITION
Marginalism became the basis for a major onslaught against
laissez faire, mainly for two reasons. The first was the early marginalists’ theory about the effects of forced wealth redistribution,
and the other was their theory of competition.
Although the second reason is most important to our present
concerns, the first deserves brief mention. One immediate impact
of the incorporation of marginal utility theory into economics was
a heightened interest in involuntary redistributions of wealth.
The marginalists following Jevons knew that utility maximization requires the individual actor to equate utilities at the margin, and they automatically assumed that this formulation held
good for the distribution of wealth or other entitlements among
different persons. The great Cambridge economists Alfred Marshall, Arthur Pigou, and Joan Robinson all believed that money
transfers from wealthier to less wealthy individuals increased total welfare, for poorer individuals placed a higher value on a
marginal dollar than did wealthier ones. They believed that the
marginal utility of an additional dollar to someone who already
had thousands must be much less than it would be to someone
who had nothing.106 As a result, Pigou107 and Robinson108 both
toyed with socialism to one degree or another, although Marshall
was more ambivalent.109 For empirical verification, they observed

105. See infra Part III.
106. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 74, at 2 (“It may make little difference
to the fullness of life of a family whether its yearly income is £1000 or £5000;
but it makes a very great difference whether the income is £30 or £150 . . . .”).
107. See Roger E. Backhouse & Steven G. Medema, Public Choice and the
Cambridge School: A New View 21–26 (Nov. 30, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=949203 (laying
out Pigou’s belief that recent improvements in the structure of government were
sufficient to overcome the problem of political self-interest that had doomed socialism in the past).
108. See Prue Kerr, Joan Robinson and Socialist Planning in the Years of
High Theory, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 489, 492 (2007) (explaining Robinson’s “argument that laisser-faire capitalism had failed to provide full employment and a
desirable allocation of labour and resources”).
109. See Backhouse & Medema, supra note 107, at 8–21 (elucidating Marshall’s thoughts on the role of the state in business, including his conclusion that
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that the impoverished would be likely to spend that dollar on
food, clothing, or shelter, which were high utility goods, while the
wealthier will already have satisfied those needs.110
These views were subsequently criticized by John Hicks and
Lionel Robbins, leading to a “Paretian” revolution in neoclassical
welfare economics, after which the welfare consequences of pure
wealth transfers no longer had unambiguous answers.111 The basis of the revolution was the idea, now a matter of fundamental
neoclassical doctrine, that although a single individual can rank
his or her own preferences, the strength of preferences cannot be
compared from one person to another.112 Neoclassical economics
once again became more-or-less agnostic on the question of the
welfare effects of involuntary wealth redistributions.113
During the interval from roughly 1890 until roughly 1935,
however, marginalist economists in England generally believed
that the “social net product,” as Pigou called it, could be increased
through forced wealth redistribution.114 This appeared to justify
the state’s hand in the economy in a big way. The impetus to involve the state was increased by neoclassical studies such as
John Maurice Clark’s Economics of Overhead Costs, which concluded that industrial production tends naturally to transfer
despite socialism’s theoretical appeal, it could not overcome the inherent corruption, inefficiency, and self-interest of government).
110. See Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were Ordinalists Wrong About
Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LITERATURE 507, 517 (1984) (“Pigou and
Marshall believed that the poor would tend to use additional money in the
most useful ways.”).
111. See J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J.
696, 711–12 (1939); Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A
Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635, 635–41 (1938).
112. See Hicks, supra note 111, at 699 (“[W]e have to face . . . the difficulty
of inter-personal comparisons. . . . You cannot take a temperature when you
have to use, not one thermometer, but an immense number of different thermometers, working on different principles, and with no necessary correlation
between their registrations.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the
Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1022 (1989) (“[T]he
role of economics in policymaking . . . was effectively torpedoed by the vehement, religious argument of the ordinalists that changes in marginal utility
cannot be compared among different persons.”).
113. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 995 (1990). See generally Cooter & Rappoport, supra
note 110, at 526–28 (discussing the “ordinance revolution” of the 1930s, which
rejected cardinal notions of utility and generally accepted the view that utility
was not comparable across individuals).
114. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism
and the Separation of Law and Economics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 805, 810 (2000)
(“[M]arginalist economic theory . . . justif[ied] widespread, state-enforced
wealth distribution.”).
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wealth away from labor and toward capitalists.115 That is, the
natural consequences of the redistributions brought about by capitalism were regressive.
The second reason for marginalism’s doubt about laissez
faire lay more centrally in price theory and industrial economics.
The mathematics of marginalism enabled the neoclassicists to
make distinctions that the classicists could not even comprehend.116 Problems that the classicists simply did not recognize or
else acknowledged only in a much less technical fashion included
the realizations that: economic actors equate their utilities at the
margin and that firms maximize profits; when a firm is maximizing profits, marginal cost equals marginal revenue; both product
differentiation and declining costs are ubiquitous and inconsistent with perfect competition; and economic equilibria can be defined for markets that are neither monopolized nor perfectly
competitive.117
One of the unforeseen consequences of marginalism is that
the stubbornness of these problems often led to policy conclusions
that seemed overly broad and somewhat hastily developed when
considered in retrospect.118 Both cost theory and, subsequently,
monopolistic competition theory, are good examples. Their impact
served to undermine confidence in competition in a great many
markets, not merely structural monopolies.119 They were to have
severe implications for both antitrust policy and regulatory policy
through the first half of the twentieth century.
A. IMPERFECT COMPETITION
In 1933, Cambridge University’s Joan Robinson published
her Economics of Imperfect Competition, the first systematic application of marginalist analysis to product-differentiated mar115. See CLARK, supra note 82, at 7–9; supra notes 90–94 and accompanying
text.
116. See Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 1021–23 (arguing that, with the
advent of marginalist mathematics, the neoclassicists were able to further
their knowledge of “competition” beyond the classicists).
117. Cf. id. at 1025–29 (outlining the classical and neoclassical conceptions
of competition).
118. Cf. id. at 1024 (citing Justice Burrough’s statement that public policy
“is a very unruly horse, and once you get astride it you can never know where
it will carry you” to highlight the pitfalls of economic policymaking).
119. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 257 (1985) (arguing that real world markets result in skewed application of economic theories by courts, which resulted in less confidence in before-and-after comparisons of empirical information).
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kets.120 In such markets, firms have somewhat downward-sloping
demand curves, which mean that they have a certain amount of
discretion over price.121 Robinson developed the concept of a continuous “marginal revenue” curve and showed how product differentiation affected the choice of output and price by firms that
have some discretion over what output to produce and what price
to charge.122 For such a firm, charging a slightly higher price does
not entail losing all of its sales, as it does for the perfect competitor.123 Rather, the firm in imperfect competition typically sells
slightly less as it charges a slightly higher price, or slightly more
as it cuts price.124
Robinson’s work analyzed why product-differentiated markets tended to work more poorly than markets for fungible products. Mainly, in differentiated markets prices tended to be above
marginal cost, price discrimination was relatively common, and
firms had incentive to differentiate their products further in order to avoid the consequences of head-to-head competition.125 Robinson generally assumed that there were no barriers to entry by
new firms.126 As a result, firms continuously differentiated their
products in order to escape from close rivals.127
The principal distinction between Marshall’s Principles of
Economics and Robinson’s Imperfect Competition is in the nature
of the paradigm “firm” that the two authors imagined. While
Marshall took on some of the mathematics of marginalism, the
firm for him remained the classical enterprise producing a fungible good in intense competition with other firms, or else a monopolist not facing any competitors.128 In sharp contrast, Robinson’s
120. ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 92–94.
121. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Analyzing Monopoly Power Ex Ante, 5 N.Y.U. J.
L. & BUS. 153, 197 n.189 (2009) (“[T]he seller of virtually any good in the most
competitive markets has some ability to choose price (that is, faces a downward-sloping demand curve) . . . .”).
122. See ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 51–55 (discussing marginal revenue).
123. See id. at 316–17 (arguing that monopolists do harm when costs are
rising as there are no alternatives for consumers).
124. See id. at 51.
125. See id. at 179–80.
126. See id. at 92–93 (“The abnormal profits are a symptom rather than a
cause of the situation in which new firms will find it profitable to enter the
trade. But the artificial device regarding the abnormal profits as a causal factor is of great assistance in simplifying the formal argument . . . .”).
127. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 72 (“Where the possibility of differentiation exists . . . sales depend upon the skill with which the good is distinguished from others and made to appeal to a particular group of buyers.”).
128. See generally MARSHALL, supra note 74.
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Imperfect Competition imagined a manufacturing world much
more like the one we actually have, in which products are somewhat differentiated from one another yet compete.129 Thus the
real jolt of Imperfect Competition lay in its theorizing that realworld markets in fact perform much less robustly than economists had imagined. While the classicists were correct that true
monopoly was the exception rather than the rule, they were far
too sanguine about everything else. Robinson observed that
“economists, misled by the logical priority of perfect competition
in their scheme, were somehow trapped into thinking that it
must be of equal importance in the real world.”130 But in fact “the
real world did not fulfill the assumptions of perfect competition.”131 Or as Joseph Schumpeter observed in a review of Robinson’s book, the “common practice” of political economy through
Marshall had been to look “at the whole stretch of ground between the two limiting cases [monopoly and perfect competition]
as rather unsafe and incapable of yielding determinate results.”132 However, “[a]s the majority of practical cases lie on that
stretch,” the result was “highly unsatisfactory.”
Things look still worse as soon as we realize that the case of free competition cannot be looked upon as an approximation, and that it becomes a distortion of what it is meant to describe if its assumptions
are not fulfilled exactly. To complete our discomfiture, analysis of
these assumptions and the resulting correct formulation of them reveal the fact that they are much farther removed from reality and
much less likely to be fulfilled than even Marshall probably
thought.133

Notwithstanding all of this talk about the “real world,” the
lack of empirical information in Robinson’s book is stunning.
Fundamentally, Imperfect Competition is a geometry text that
draws certain curves and lines based on assumptions about how
rational actors, including business firms, behave. In Robinson’s
case, the assumptions were utility maximization for biological
persons134 or profit maximization for business firms.135 She
129. See ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 4 –5 (emphasizing the difficulty in
defining the world in either a perfectly monopolistic or competitive sense).
130. Id. at 3–4.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Schumpeter, supra note 35, at 249.
133. Id. at 249–50.
134. See ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 218 (“The principle underlying the
analysis of the decisions of a buyer as to how much of a commodity to buy is
that he will equate marginal utility to marginal cost.”).
135. See id. at 16–17 (arguing that the entrepreneur, the controlling interest of a firm, is assumed to maximize profits).
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stated as her most fundamental assumption that “each individual
acts in a sensible manner in the circumstances in which he finds
himself from the point of view of his own economic interests.”136
“Sensible” meant profit maximization.137
Robinson’s ideological subtext was relatively clear, however.
“We see on every side a drift towards monopolisation . . . .”138
Further, Robinson believed that capitalist entrepreneurs were
systematically transferring wealth toward themselves and away
from the one set of participants in the economy who were unable
to differentiate their output effectively—namely, labor.139 Soon
after Imperfect Competition was published, Robinson became a
Keynesian and an active socialist in the British Labour Party.140
B. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND THE MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION REVOLUTION
In a market of fungible products, consumers are indifferent
to everything but price.141 However, if products are differentiated
the calculus of choice becomes much more complex. Some customers may still buy strictly on price, but others will be drawn to
features present in one version of the product but not others. The
greater the “space” between a product and its most adjacent competitor, the larger these preference differences are likely to be.
Further, they are exacerbated by market factors that limit product mobility. The more difficult it is to redesign a product to look
like a successful rival’s, the more robust that rival’s success will
be. This accounts for the very large power of intellectual property
rights in product-differentiated markets. Such rights only rarely
create “monopolies” in the economic sense, but they do tend to
136. Id. at 15.
137. See id. at 16 (“[An individual] is assumed always to choose the output
which will maximise his net receipts.”).
138. Id. at 307.
139. See id. at 281–304 (discussing monopolistic and monopsonistic exploitation of labor).
140. See generally SOCIALISM AND MARGINALISM IN ECONOMICS: 1870–
1930, at 10–20 (Ian Steedman ed., 1995) (focusing mainly on Continental Europe and other non-English speaking countries); Bertram Schefold, Are Economic Theories Historically Specific?, in THE ECONOMICS OF JOAN ROBINSON
312 (Maria Cristina Marcuzzo et al. eds., 1996) (noting Robinson’s position
with respect to socialism and Anglo-Italian economic theory); Kerr, supra note
108, at 491–503 (discussing Robinson’s later career and her flirtation with socialism).
141. See COURNOT, supra note 21, at 46 (“The cheaper an article is, the
greater ordinarily is the demand for it. . . . [T]he sales or the demand generally
. . . increases when the price decreases.”).
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create or preserve product differentiation by making it more difficult for one firm to copy another firm’s product precisely.142
Product differentiation undermined most of the arguments
from prior to the 1930s that high fixed costs led to ruinous competition, largely ending the fixed-cost controversy.143 Under the
prevailing Marshallian model in vogue in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, competitive equilibrium was seen as
inconsistent with fixed costs, and the attempts to solve this puzzle within an industry producing an identical product were all
technical failures.144 However, firms making differentiated products did not simply manufacture more and more as long as price
was above marginal cost; rather they invested in distinguishing
their products in order to avoid head-to-head competition.145 As
University of Texas economist Spurgeon Bell had observed already in 1918:
If fixed costs are large there must be a style or brand competition on
the one hand or, on the other hand, consolidation of producers similar
to that which took place in the steel industry, in the railroads, and in
various large-plant industries producing goods of a comparatively
staple character.146

While the product differentiation models of the early 1930s
largely solved the ruinous competition problem, they substituted
another set of unsettling market imperfections—most significantly, equilibria in which prices were significantly above marginal
cost and firms carried excess capacity.147 The result was a signifi142. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 372–402 (2003) (examining the
complex relationship between intellectual property rights and monopoly under
antitrust law).
143. See discussion supra Part II.
144. See JAN KEPPLER, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY: ORIGINS,
RESULTS, AND IMPLICATIONS 46–121 (1994) (discussing at length the attempts
and failures of a number of economists seeking to solve this problem); Steven
Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra, Introduction to THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT 1, 4 –7 (Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra eds.,
2004) (discussing Marshall’s own struggles with the problem).
145. See Bell, supra note 102, at 520 (“Where the staple character of the
commodity can be modified by the production of different brands, the coöperative relation is much more secure. It is very difficult to prevent cutthroat competition among the producers of ordinary salt because it is not possible . . . to
use a variety of brands to good effect.”).
146. Id. at 523; see also Jones, supra note 102, at 491–97 (discussing the
effect of competition on the railroad industry).
147. See William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 368 (1966) (arguing that
excess capacity can be avoided when prices are above marginal cost so long as
the monopolist’s competitors do not enter the market).
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cant change in the focus of competition policy. With the exception
of price fixing, which is quite common in markets for fungible
products, antitrust policy since the 1940s has been preoccupied
mainly with anticompetitive practices in product-differentiated
markets.148 This was particularly true of the law of vertical restraints.
During the middle part of the twentieth century, Chamberlin’s monopolistic competition model became the ruling model of
competition theory.149 Incorporating product differentiation into
competitive economic models produced important conclusions
that most of the economists involved in the fixed-cost controversy
had not anticipated. The general problem of ruinous competition
was much less imposing because firms in a differentiated market
could obtain higher prices by keeping their own output in check.
Increasingly, ruinous competition came to be seen as unique to
markets such as those for commodities, where goods or services
could not readily be differentiated, and thus firms were required
to compete on price alone.150 At the same time, perfect competition was not in the cards either because prices were always above
marginal cost—indeed, it was the drive toward marginal cost
pricing in industries with high fixed cost that led competitors to
ruin.
Chamberlin’s model generally assumed a sufficiently large
number of firms in a market that Cournot-style coordination of
output was not significant.151 Further, entry was easy. However,
each firm also produced a variation of the product that was distinguishable in the eyes of buyers.152 As a result buyers preferred
one firm’s offering over others, but buyers’ individual preferences

148. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 257 (2001) (discussing the push in the
1980s to develop an economic system more sensitive to anticompetitive behavior).
149. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1150–
51 (Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter ed., 1954) (“The Theory of Monopolistic Compeitition [that] sprang . . . from Professor E.H. Chamberlin’s head . . . met with
a corresponding success . . . .”). See generally CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at
1–16 (outlining his monopolistic competition model).
150. See Jones, supra note 102, at 495 (“If a reduction in prices under these
circumstances has any effect . . . it must be either to attract away business of a
competitor (to his detriment), or to induce dealers to lay in supplies for the future, which spoils the market. In either event the outcome is injurious to the
[commodities] trade.”).
151. See generally CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41.
152. See id. at 71–72 (outlining firms’ efforts to distinguish their products).
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varied from one firm to the next.153 As a result, each firm faced a
demand curve that sloped downward, allowing the firm to sell
more by cutting its price. Firms continuously repositioned themselves in such a market by seeking to differentiate their own offerings from those of rivals, but also by copying the offerings of
rivals who appeared to be earning higher returns.154 The mathematics of monopolistic competition are complex; however, Chamberlin concluded that while in the short run firms would earn
some profits in the form of prices higher than marginal cost, in
the long run these profits would be frittered away as other firms
duplicate that firm’s successes or the firm invests in further differentiation in order to protect its profits.155 Long-run profits are
zero, or just enough to pay off fixed-cost investments at the competitive rate. Further, in equilibrium, monopolistically competitive firms are always carrying excess capacity; that is, they could
be producing more product, but would be forced by decreasing
demand to cut the price toward marginal cost.
IV. CONSENSUS AND WORKABILITY IN COMPETITION
POLICY
Robinson and Chamberlin’s works were widely viewed as
placing a severe limitation on the classical idea that competition
is robust and that markets tend toward it.156 This in turn was
thought to explain at least part of the subsequent antitrust hostility toward such things as advertising and “excessive” product
differentiation, which reached its high point in the 1970s.157
153. See id. at 69 (“[W]hen products are differentiated, buyers are given a
basis for preference, and will therefore be paired with sellers, not in random
fashion . . . but according to these preferences.”).
154. Cf. id. at 83–84 (arguing that an increase in profit attracts competitors into the field).
155. See id. at 72 (“Where the possibility of differentiation exists . . . sales
depend upon the skill with which the good is distinguished from others and
made to appeal to a particular group of buyers.”).
156. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American
Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1672 (1988) (“The great events signalling
[sic] the fall of neoclassical political economy were the publication of Joan Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition and Edward Chamberlin’s Theory
of Monopolistic Competition in 1933.”).
157. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. COMANOR & THOMAS A. WILSON, ADVERTISING
AND MARKET POWER 245 (1974) (“[A]dvertising creates a significant barrier to
new competition in a number of important industries.”); B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 723, 726 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989) (citing
Chamberlin’s study to show that product differentiation can result in firms’
equilibrium being “less than minimum efficient scale”); Richard A. Posner, The
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Many members of the Chicago School rejected the theory of monopolistic competition for being too complex and excessively
structuralist, in the sense that it elevated structure and minimized the importance of behavior as the principal determinant of
industry performance.158 It is no wonder that in our poststructuralist age monopolistic competition is regarded as a kind
of throwback to New Deal interventionism.159
In a critically important sense, however, the new theories of
product differentiation did quite the opposite. They served to restore the notion of a competitive equilibrium in an era plagued by
theory indicating that high fixed costs would lead to ruinous
competition and either monopoly, collusion, or regulation in any
industry with significant fixed costs. In this regard, the corrective
force of Chamberlin’s work in particular is difficult to exaggerate.
To be sure, monopolistic competition is not a perfectly competitive equilibrium, but it is a competitive equilibrium that admits
of large numbers of firms, is consistent with easy entry, and produces a large variety of products at costs that may be only a little
higher than minimum efficient cost.160

Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 930 n.12 (1979)
(noting the continued academic support for antitrust law’s hostility towards
advertising); Note, Annual Style Change in the Automobile Industry as an Unfair Method of Competition, 80 YALE L.J. 567, 586–92 (1971) (describing production differentiation as a barrier to entry by new firms); H. Paul Root,
Should Product Differentiation Be Restricted?, J. MKTG., July 1972, at 3, 3
(charging that product differentiation “created and maintained industry structures that are not competitive”). Of course, whether product differentiation is
“excessive” depends on its degree. See Product Differentiation, supra, at 763
(“[I]n a society that values diversity, there is a trade-off between economizing
on resources, by reducing the costs of producing existing products, and satisfying the desire for diversity, by increasing the number of products.”).
158. See George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in FIVE
LECTURES ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 22–24 (1949) (discussing the inadequacies
of the theory of monopolistic competition); Louis A. Dow & Lewis M. Abernathy, The Chicago School on Economic Methodology and Monopolistic Competition, 22 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 235, 238 (1963) (“The Chicago School . . . is quite
explicit in its rejection of the model of monopolistic competition as a useful
portion of economic analysis.”).
159. See Hovenkamp, supra note 114, at 819 (“[T]he new neoclassicism incorporated New Deal anomalies such as . . . monopolistic competition.”). But
see Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297, 297–308 (1977) (reviving the
monopolistic competition model as way of assessing social cost and value of
product differentiation).
160. See BLAUG, supra note 15, at 391–93.
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A. RUINOUS COMPETITION VERSUS MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION
Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition solved the
ruinous competition puzzle by illustrating how firms in productdifferentiated markets would shift their efforts into repositioning
their products rather than producing more.161 Stability in multifirm markets with economies of scale became possible. So how
one looks at Chamberlin’s solution depends on the starting point.
If one begins with perfect competition as the norm, then monopolistic competition creates the impression of a sick industry, producing less than it could be producing consistent with minimum
costs, paying for chronic excess capacity, and consuming too
many resources on excessive product differentiation and advertising. On the other hand, if one begins with a situation in which
competition is thought to be inherently ruinous because it denies
firms the ability to recover fixed-cost investments, then monopolistic competition is actually a fairly happy alternative to the monopoly, price fixing, or regulation that ruinous competition imagined.
The all-important adjustments that competition policy had to
make were: first, learning to live with a certain amount of imperfection; and second, distinguishing those markets in which socially acceptable amounts of competition could be sustained through
relatively passive state policymaking, such as antitrust, from
those that would require more active intervention. The very
statement of these adjustments indicates that controversy was
hardly at an end. Nevertheless, in a very important way these adjustments defined the terms of future debate.
The ruinous competition debate gradually died away as
economists developed theories of short-run and long-run costs,
which seemed to solve most of the problems, at least in productdifferentiated markets.162 In the short run, firms might be driven
to ruinous competition because their fixed costs are so high.
However, in the long run excess plants will wear out and not be
replaced and market equilibrium will be restored. John Maurice
Clark’s path-breaking book on fixed costs set the stage for theory
that permitted equilibria to emerge even in industries subject to
161. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 81–100 (discussing firms’ behavior
in product-differentiated markets to establish group equilibrium).
162. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of
Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 140 (1989) (“John Maurice
Clark’s influential consensus book on overhead costs generally ended the
[ruinous competition] debate . . . .”).
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high fixed costs.163 As Morris Copeland observed, “[e]conomic
theory has from the start proceeded as if all the costs incurred in
any given period of time were directly traceable to the business
transacted during that period.”164 Or as Schumpeter said in his
critique of Joan Robinson, “the element of time must be got hold
of in a much more efficient manner, if for no other reason because
what people try to maximize is certainly gain over time.”165
Clark’s 1940 essay on Workable Competition offered a way of
merging multiple market imperfections, namely those caused by
fixed costs and product differentiation, into a single model for
competition policy.166 He observed that market imperfections
have a way of canceling each other out: “If there are, for example,
five conditions, all of which are essential to perfect competition,
and the first is lacking in a given case, then it no longer follows
that we are necessarily better off for the presence of any one of
the other four.”167 In the case of a purely fungible product, prices
would necessarily be driven to short-run cost.168 At the other extreme—wide differentiations in the product—one ends up with
virtual monopoly.169 But in the middle one sees an area where
competitive stability can be achieved, even though it is not quite
perfect.170 Further, while perfect competition demands conti163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See CLARK, supra note 82, at 432–35.
Morris A. Copeland, Book Review, 40 POL. SCI. Q. 296, 296 (1925).
Schumpeter, supra note 35, at 256.
See Clark, supra note 57, at 246–56.
Id. at 242.
See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES (1985), reprinted in 2 PRACTISING LAW INST., 35TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST
LAW INSTITUTE: CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
837, 847 (1994) (“[A] fungible product . . . will produce a market with highly
elastic demand and vigorous interbrand price competition. . . . [F]ungible
products are subject to less product enhancement by dealers.”).
169. See Peter F. Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966
Upon Security Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1424 (1968) (“[P]roduct differentiation generally leads to
higher prices and monopoly returns . . . .”).
170. See id. at 241–43, 245 (“[The] [i]mportance of [the] competitive element hinges largely on [the] extent to which quality differences are open to
free imitation.”). John Maurice Clark made a similar point a year earlier:
For example, it appears that the results of an open-price system may
be to raise prices or to lower them, depending on the industry to
which it is applied. Brands and differences of quality between competing producers are spoken of as elements of “partial monopoly”, yet if
producers are few and large, the quality product may show on the
whole healthier competitive conditions than the standardized product, since in the latter case a reduction of price by one producer is
sure to be promptly met by his rivals.
Clark, supra note 83, at 130.
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nuous production at capacity, in the real world plants are built
for the long run, while market demand fluctuates over the short
run.171 Necessarily, a plant designed for peak demand will be operating at partial capacity at least some of the time.172
Clark gave manufacturing of both automobiles and automobile tires as examples of markets that were workably competitive
notwithstanding moderate product differentiation and a relatively large investment in durable plants and equipment.173 Speaking of such markets he concluded that “[i]n such cases, one may
hope that government need not assume the burden of doing
something about every departure from the model of perfect competition.”174 Speaking of the relative value of competition policy
against its alternatives, Clark wrote:
It will mean something if we can find, after due examination, that
some of these forms [of imperfect or monopolistic competition] do their
jobs well enough to be an adequate working reliance—more serviceable, on the whole, than those substitutes which involve abandoning
reliance on competition. And it will be useful if we can learn something about the kinds and degrees of “imperfection” which are positively serviceable under particular conditions.175

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST POLICY
In the late 1930s the Roosevelt Administration undertook an
abrupt and radical change in antitrust policy.176 The twenty-year
171. See Clark, supra note 57, at 250 (discussing at length the long-term
and short-term ramifications of market behavior).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 256.
174. Id.; see also Clark, supra note 83, at 130–31:
The kind of policy which is indicated seems to be, not a laissez-faire
acquiescence in any and all forms of trade practices which industry
may evolve, and not an indiscriminate condemnation of all forms of
canalized or restricted or “imperfect” competition, regardless of
whether the competition that is restricted is of the cutthroat variety
or not. What seems to be called for is a realistic control of trade practices which should not simply prohibit unduly restrictive forms, but
should assume constructive responsibility for working out for each industry, where unduly restrictive forms are found, the form which, in
that industry, bids fair to give the nearest practicable approach to the
results of “normal” competition . . . . It cannot be done by merely
bombing at existing trade practices with negative “cease and desist”
orders and letting the fragments fall where they may.
175. See Clark, supra note 57, at 242.
176. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 374 (1966) (noting that in 1937 the Department of Justice began to prosecute major antitrust cases); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 163 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris
eds., 1963) (discussing that the First New Deal “told business what it must do”
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period leading up to the New Deal has been described as an era of
government-authorized cartels, or “cooperative competition.”177
The early New Deal carried this thinking to the extreme, substituting state planning and organized private ordering for competition.178 The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
was relegated to bringing a few minor cases and staying out of
the way of the cooperative planning that other federal agencies
were promoting.179
In sharp contrast, the antitrust policies ushered in as part of
the Second New Deal were highly suspicious of any form of
agreement among rivals and increasingly hostile toward both
dominant firms and vertical integration. The Madison Oil case
(Socony-Vacuum) is the best known exemplar of firms caught between the conflicting demands of two different government policies.180 With at least the tacit encouragement of the National Recovery Administration, the petroleum industry had undertaken a
cartel-like self-regulatory program to control excessive output
and ruinous competition in the petroleum industry through competitor coordination.181 Then, in an abrupt switch, the governand the Second New Deal “told business what it must not do”); MICHAEL E.
PARRISH, ANXIOUS DECADES: AMERICA IN PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION 296–
99 (1992) (discussing the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act
which suspended antitrust laws); William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1132 (1989) (discussing the antitrust revival
in Roosevelt’s second term). See generally HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1948) (discussing a contemporary’s view of the
changes).
177. See RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888–
1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 76–89 (1996) (discussing cooperative competition in the context of trade associations); Jason E. Taylor & Peter G. Klein, An
Anatomy of a Cartel: The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the
Compliance Crisis of 1934, 26 RES. ECON. HIST. 235, 242–48 (2008) (discussing
how the government facilitated cartels through the NIRA).
178. See PARRISH, supra note 176, at 297 (“[N]ever had the government of
the United States become so deeply involved in the day-to-day economic and
social arrangements of the American people.”).
179. See HAWLEY, supra note 176, at 373 (noting that prior to 1937, the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice confined itself to mostly
“peanut” cases).
180. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 201–10
(1940) (noting the alleged federal government acquiescence to the defendants’
actions). Another result was expansiveness in collusion cases involving product-differentiated markets. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
306 U.S. 208, 232 (1939) (finding collusion between movie theaters and movie
distributors).
181. See HAWLEY, supra note 176, at 374 (discussing the Madison Oil cases). See generally Daniel A. Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony-
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ment issued a criminal indictment against the companies.182 Explanation for the switch is generally laid to the FDR Administration’s non-ideological bent, its penchant for experimentation, and
the loss of enthusiasm for social planning that followed Supreme
Court decisions striking down significant portions of the first
New Deal’s recovery agenda.183
One hesitates to ascribe too many policy implications to a
highly academic set of ideas about industrial organization expressed mainly as geometric figures. But the facts are powerful.
Both the ruinous competition theories of the early century
through the 1920s, and the monopolistic competition theories of
the mid-1930s and after, saw severe problems in the traditional
competitive model.184 But the implications for antitrust policy
could not have been more different. The fixed-cost controversy led
naturally to the view that less antitrust is better—that mergers
should be tolerated even to the point of monopoly and that price
fixing was otherwise inevitable. The message this sent to policymakers was that antitrust is a bad thing. Its main impact would
be to prevent efficient mergers or limit socially beneficial coordination of price or output.
By contrast, monopolistic competition theory saw a world in
which manufacturers competed mainly by differentiating their
products.185 Rather than overproducing, they tended to operate
with excess capacity.186 In cases of concentrated markets and
Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust in the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORIES
91–119 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007) (discussing in detail the
events leading up to the Madison Oil cases, the trial, and the aftermath).
182. See HAWLEY, supra note 176, at 374 (discussing the government’s
prosecution of the petroleum industry). Daniel Crane notes that the Madison
Oil indictment stretched back to cover a time period when the defendants
were acting under the orders of Harold Ickes, FDR’s Secretary of the Interior,
under the authority of section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which had not yet been declared unconstitutional. See Crane, supra note
181, at 102–03.
183. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 293 U.S.
388, 432–33 (1935) (invalidating section 9 of NIRA); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 595 (1935) (invalidating section 3 of NIRA); see also HAWLEY, supra note 176, at 127–30 (discussing Schechter Poultry
and the end of NIRA).
184. See generally CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 71 (discussing monopolistic competition); Jones, supra note 102 (discussing ruinous competition in
the context of railroads).
185. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 71 (“The volume of [a monopolistic
competitor’s] sales depends in part upon the manner in which his product differs from that of his competitors.”).
186. See id. at 104 –09 (noting that monopolistic competition has an equilibrium at an excess capacity).
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high entry barriers, monopolistic competition turned into oligopoly, with its attendant low output and high prices. Product differentiation seemed “excessive,” particularly since it was accompanied by heavy expenses for advertising and other forms of
promotion.187 Further, these were all problems that appeared to
beg for aggressive antitrust solutions.
V. STRUCTURALISM IN POST-WAR COMPETITION
THEORY
Clark’s Workable Competition essay provided an important
platform for working out a competition policy that took the many
imperfections exposed by marginalist analysis into account. Several economists offered critiques and suggested improvements.188
Clark salvaged the policy idea that markets were sufficiently robust such that only occasional government intervention via the
antitrust laws was justified, rather than more aggressive forms of
regulation or simple acquiescence in monopoly.
But this was hardly the end of the story. Classicists had generally assumed that competitive markets were more or less the
same, with monopoly as the outstanding and relatively rare exception. But the fixed-cost controversy, the theories of imperfect
and monopolistic competition, and Cournot oligopoly theory all
suggested that markets in fact differ from one another, perhaps a
great deal. This suggested in turn that a thoroughly articulated
antitrust policy would call for different rules for markets with different structural characteristics, something that had previously
attracted institutionalists such as the legal realist Walton Hamilton.189 After Chamberlin, it was picked up by more mainstream
187. See id. at 171–72 (discussing selling costs in relation to excess capacity).
188. See, e.g., TEMP. NAT’L ECONOMIC COMM., 76TH CONG., INVESTIGATION
OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER: COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY, Monograph No. 21, at 8–9 (Comm. Print 1940) (written
by Clair Wilcox) (“[C]ompetition may be said to be . . . workable whenever it
operates over time to afford buyers substantial protection against exploitation
at the hands of sellers and affords sellers similar protection . . . .”); CORWIN D.
EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 9–10 (1949) (discussing seven characteristics an economic policy should aim to achieve); George J. Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 AM. ECON. REV. (SUPP.) 1, 2–3 (1942) (“It is necessary . . . to replace the standard of competitive enterprise economy by a
more specific comparative system . . . [such as] workable competition.”).
189. Walton H. Hamilton, The Problem of Anti-Trust Reform, 32 COLUM. L.
REV. 173, 176–77 (1932) (“The simple uniformity of the older acts may have to
give way to an accommodation of public oversight to the varying necessities of
different trades.”).
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competition economists, particularly at Harvard.190 One byproduct was many single-industry studies illustrating the competitive conditions in particular markets.191
More ominously, product differentiation and fixed costs implied that firms had discretion over price and product configuration as well as output. As a result, marginalist economic models
had to accommodate the possibility of strategic behavior in ways
that classicism could not even fathom. The principal variables
that accounted for the differences among markets were: (1) the
number of firms and their size differences; (2) the extent of fixed
costs, or economies of scale; (3) the degree of product differentiation and the amount of mobility among differentiations; and (4)
ease of entry. The two extreme cases provoked the least controversy. In highly competitive markets with modest scale economies, easy entry, a fairly homogenous product, and typically numerous firms, competition could be trusted to discipline even
modest deviations from competitive behavior.192 The only alternatives open to firms were to produce all they could at the market
price or to collude. At the other extreme, if scale economies were
so significant that they dictated a single firm for a market, then
monopoly plus price regulation might be in order.
The two intermediate classes, monopolistic competition and
structural oligopoly, were much more troublesome. The less problematic of the two was monopolistic competition, characterized by
product differentiation and easy entry, where prices would be
above marginal cost but workable competition could be attained.193 More problematic was oligopoly, characterized by a
small number of firms, high entry barriers, and varying degrees
of product differentiation.194
In the late 1930s and 1940s, Chamberlin’s monopolistic competition theory swept the field of competition economics.195 How190. See, e.g., CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY
CORPORATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE 1–24 (1956)
(discussing a Harvard professor’s analysis of the shoe industry).
191. See, e.g., SAMUEL M. LOESCHER, IMPERFECT COLLUSION IN THE CEMENT INDUSTRY 1–8 (1959); JESSE W. MARKHAM, COMPETITION IN THE RAYON
INDUSTRY 1–5 (1952); JAMES M. MCKIE, TIN CANS AND TIN PLATE: A STUDY IN
TWO RELATED MARKETS 1–9 (1959); MERTON J. PECK, COMPETITION IN THE
ALUMINUM INDUSTRY, 1945–1958, at 1–4 (1961).
192. See generally CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 11–22.
193. See generally id. at 56–70.
194. See id. at 30–31 (describing the basic problems facing oligopolies).
195. See GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND
FREE ENTERPRISE 87–89 (1951) (discussing how textbook writers quickly incorporated Chamberlin’s principles).
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ever, the policy emphasis switched away from Chamberlin’s particular model, characterized by easy entry and a fairly large
number of firms, to oligopoly.196 The troublesome cases were not
restaurants, where product differentiation was abundant but entry was easy. Rather, they were manufacturing, which was often
characterized by differentiated products, high entry barriers, and
sufficient scale economies to dictate a small number of firms.
The economics of the day perceived one very important difference between monopolistic competition generally and monopolistic competition in oligopoly industries. In the former, ease of
entry plus a large number of firms drove firms to innovate continuously in order to reposition their products. One might conclude
that there was too much product differentiation and too much of
collateral outputs such as advertising. But in the long run prices
were driven to cost. None of this was likely in a market with a
small number of firms and high entry barriers. Joe Bain, who became the most prominent spokesperson for Harvard School structuralism, complained in 1950 that workable competition in oligopoly industries would be much more difficult to achieve than
Clark had anticipated.197
Harvard dominated economic thinking about competition
policy from the 1940s through the 1970s and had a very considerable influence on antitrust policy.198 Its principals were
Chamberlin, Edward S. Mason on the Harvard economics faculty,
and Joe S. Bain, who received his Ph.D. under Mason but who
spent most of his career in the economics department of the University of California at Berkeley.199
Already in 1937 Mason had observed that lawyers and economists used the term “monopoly” differently. For lawyers monopoly was identified by “restrictive or abusive practices” while

196. See id. at 92–93 (discussing the shift away from the Chamberlin model
in the realm of public policy).
197. See Joe S. Bain, Workable Competition in Oligopoly: Theoretical Considerations and Some Empirical Evidence, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 35, 37–38 (1950)
(“[A]ny economist’s assessment of the workability of competition is likely to
have a highly provisional and even personal character and is likely to rest
heavily on the ad hoc assessment of obvious alternatives in given situations.”).
198. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 35–38 (discussing the influence of the Harvard school on public policy).
199. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal Report
and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 219, 219–22 (2009)
(discussing Chamberlin, Mason, and Bain).
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economists identified monopoly as market control.200 Writing a
dozen years later and responding to John Maurice Clark’s call for
a workable competition policy, Mason concluded that lawyers had
largely come around to the economists’ view and increasingly
were identifying monopoly as a structural rather than behavioral
problem.201
In extending Mason’s work, Bain found plenty of structural
signs indicating that competition was not workable in concentrated industries: profit rates that were above benchmark normal
returns on investment; plants that were larger than justified by
scale economies; chronic excess capacity; and lags in adoption of
cost-reducing technology. Bain stated, “A market could be considered a case of unworkable competition if it had an extremely bad
rating in any direction or moderately bad or suspicious ratings in
several.”202 Further:
[W]hatever the degree of association within oligopolies between competitive behavior and results, it seems quite likely that such behavior
may be in turn either influenced or determined by certain characteristics of the underlying market structure. If so, a demonstrated association between market structure and results would establish the
more fundamental determinants of workability of competition (and,
also, determinants more easily influenced by conventional public policy measures).203

Bain was very critical of those who believed that the relationship between structure and performance was “indeterminate.”204 He thought it possible to “arrive at hypotheses concerning the systematic association of oligopolistic market structure
and results.”205 Bain then proposed a research agenda that would
relate market structure to such things as the likelihood and success of collusion, price-cost margins, and innovation rates. Most
importantly, he believed, the height of entry barriers into concentrated markets determined performance. In Bain’s later work entry barriers emerged as the single most decisive determinant of
price and output in concentrated industries. His own popular text

200. See Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J.
34, 43 (1937) (“By monopoly . . . the courts did not mean control of the market
but restriction of competition.”).
201. See Edward S. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in
the United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1271–76 (1949) (discussing how monopoly in the legal sense has moved towards a workable competition model).
202. Bain, supra note 197, at 37–38.
203. Id. at 38.
204. See id. at 39.
205. Id.
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on industrial organization economics furnished the theoretical
basis for that research agenda.206
A. THE STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE (S-C-P)
PARADIGM
The Mason/Bain paradigm for industrial competition constituted a formal attempt to relate an industry’s structure to its performance, with performance referring to degree of competitiveness. The powerful evaluation tool that resulted, is known today
as the structure-conduct-performance, or S-C-P, paradigm. During its heyday, the S-C-P paradigm was subjected to more empirical testing than any economic model in history.207
The theory behind the S-C-P paradigm was simple enough.
Using Cournot-style analysis of profit-maximizing behavior in
concentrated markets, one could relate industry performance to
structure, in particular the number of firms and the height of entry barriers.208 More generally, under the paradigm, industry
structure was thought to determine conduct.209 For example,
firms in concentrated industries with high fixed costs could not
avoid comparing their prices and determining whether to match
or undercut their rivals, nor could they avoid deciding whether a
new product configuration in a market was necessary to their
own success or how others might respond. This conduct was in
turn thought to dictate performance.210 Given an expression in
which structure entails conduct and conduct entails performance,
conduct itself dropped out as a variable of interest. One could
predict performance simply by knowing something about structure.
206. See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER
CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 21–24 (1956) (discussing the value of a condition of entry to a firm); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174 (1959) [hereinafter BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION] (discussing how the ability of a few firms to charge higher prices was the “essence
of any barrier to entry”). See generally Joe S. Bain, Conditions of Entry and the
Emergence of Monopoly, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR REGULATION 215, 219–26 (Edward H. Chamberlin ed., 1954) [hereinafter Bain, Conditions of Entry] (discussing condition of entry and its effect on the tendencies of
monopoly).
207. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 199, at 219–22 (discussing the
S-C-P paradigm, its history, and its demise in the wake of the publication of
the Neal and Stigler Reports).
208. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 36 (discussing the S-C-P paradigm).
209. See id. (“[T]he [S-C-P] paradigm held that a given market structure
dictated certain types of conduct . . . .”).
210. See id.
AND
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In the 1950s the S-C-P paradigm emerged as the most elegant and comprehensive model of industry competition in the
marginalist era.211 Its reductionism contributed to its explanatory power. Conduct was thought to be difficult to assess, largely
because for most conduct numerous alternative explanations,
both anticompetitive and pro-competitive, were possible. A large
firm’s actions intended to increase its own sales were presumptively competitive, while actions intended to deny sales to rivals
might be thought presumptively anticompetitive. But how does
one tell the difference in a concentrated market where most of a
firm’s output increases come at the expense of a rival? The S-C-P
paradigm promised economists, and thus antitrust policymakers,
a way of addressing these problems without troubling themselves
about the manifold ambiguities inherent in analyzing conduct.
Bolstering Bain’s commitment to using the S-C-P paradigm
as a policy tool, was his belief that industrial concentration in
America was excessive. He concluded that firms were larger than
necessary to attain available efficiencies.212 Bain argued that the
long-run average cost curve of most firms had a very large flat
bottom. In order to be profitable a firm must recover its long-run
costs, and the bottom of the curve represents the place where unit
costs were lowest—that is, where the firm was producing most
efficiently. A flat bottom entailed that once a firm had attained
minimum efficient scale it could continue to grow larger without
acquiring any inefficiencies from larger size. As a result, while a
market in which minimum efficient scale was, say, a ten percent
market share could accommodate ten efficient firms, such a market might in fact have only three or four firms.213 In the presence
of high entry barriers, which Bain tended to find readily, this
theory had strong implications for antitrust policy. It suggested
that there was a concentration “ratchet” in the sense that even
after a firm attained all scale economies, nothing kept it from
growing larger still, but there was no reason to expect it to become smaller. As a result, industrial concentration would tend to
increase.214 This would of course be exacerbated by a lax merger
211. See Hovenkamp, supra note 199, at 219.
212. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 206, at 358 (noting
that there is “significant incidence” in the manufacturing industries where
firms are “unnecessarily large”).
213. See id. at 152–55 (noting that firms in diseconomies of scale often
have ranges above the minimum optimal scale).
214. Bain stated:
If . . . diseconomies of large scale are not important over a wide range,
so that any firm can attain optimal efficiency either at a very small
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policy that permitted firms to grow by acquisition as well as internal expansion.
Significantly, as concentration increased and the number of
firms in an industry declined, productive efficiency would not diminish. Anticompetitive behavior would increase, however, as the
firms acquired greater incentives to behave oligopolistically or
collude. Or to say it differently, once a firm grew large enough to
attain all production economies it could not make further profits
by reducing its costs. However, it could profit by increasing prices, which would occur as the market became more oligopolistic.215
The idea that firms were much larger than they needed to be to
attain all available scale economies played an important role in
the congressional hearings that led to the 1950 Celler-Kefauver
amendments to the anti-merger provision, section 7 of the Clayton Act.216 Bain believed that overall, American industry exhibited a trend toward growing concentration217—a theme that was
reflected in subsequent merger decisions in the Supreme Court,
such as Brown Shoe.218 Indeed, in 1960s-era merger policy a
“trend toward concentration” became a shortcut that the Supreme Court used to condemn mergers without detailed inquiry
into market structure or anticompetitive effects.219
scale or up to a much larger scale, the number of firms is no longer
forced to remain large, since firms may grow or combine without loss
of efficiency until their sizes are large and their number few. Thereupon, the force of inter-firm competition may be restricted to permit
periodic elevation of price above minimal average cost, and existing
firms may be permitted or induced to attain inefficiently large
scales . . . .
Id. at 160.
215. See id. at 170 (noting how a price “substantially in excess of cost” is
much easier to attain in oligopolistic industries).
216. See S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 3 (2d Sess. 1950).
217. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 206, at 189 (providing an overview of business concentration rates from the time of the Civil War
forward).
218. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962) (holding that the merger of a shoe manufacturer and retailer would substantially
lessen competition in the retail shoe sales sector).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
[I]ntense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration
warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of market
structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an
undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is
not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.
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Further, Bain argued, vertical integration could exacerbate
the tendency toward concentration by linking vertically related
firms with differential scales.220 Bain gave the example of vertical
integration of automobile production and automobile assembly.221
Suppose that production was subject to significant scale economies and required a sixteen percent market share for maximum
efficiency.222 Assembly of manufactured parts, however, took
place at a much smaller scale and required a market share of only two percent. But by integrating manufacturing and assembly,
particularly by making the parts specific to the design, the vertically integrated automobile manufacturer effectively gave assembly a minimum efficient scale of sixteen percent as well.223 In
Bain’s terminology the “critical” minimum scale for a vertically
integrated firm was always the stage with the largest minimum
efficient market share.224
Bain also believed that product differentiation was a much
less benign phenomenon in oligopoly than in Chamberlin’s model
of monopolistic competition. The model of monopolistic competition assumed easy entry. As a result, while prices were above
marginal cost, they were always driven to total cost over the long
run. Bain regarded product differentiation as an affirmative barrier to entry in concentrated markets. Product differentiation inherently favored established firms because it induced consumer
brand preferences, thus giving incumbent firms an advantage
over new entrants.225 In addition, product-differentiated markets
also tended to have more patent protection for existing designs
and tended to have more regimented distribution systems.226
Bain concluded that high product differentiation was one of the
factors predisposing an industry towards higher seller concentraId. at 363. See also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277
(1966) (“The facts of this case present exactly the threatening trend toward
concentration which Congress wanted to halt.”); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 316,
322–23 (relying on a trend toward concentration to justify condemning horizontal aspects of the merger); id. at 332 (relying on a trend toward vertical integration as a rationale for condemning vertical aspects).
220. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 206, at 358 (discussing vertical integration in relation to firms which are “unnecessarily large”).
221. See id.
222. See id. at 158.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 159 (“The critical optimal scale is the largest . . . .”).
225. See id. at 239 (“[E]stablished firms may enjoy a productdifferentiation advantage over potential entrants, because of the preference of
buyers for established firms and products when compared with new ones.”).
226. See id. at 240 (discussing patent protection as a source of productdifferentiation barrier).
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tion and higher accounting profits.227 This group of observations
led Bain to conclude that prices tended to be higher in markets as
the degree of product differentiation was greater.
In contrast to these structural manifestations of inadequate
competition, Bain found conduct to be extraordinarily difficult to
assess. He concluded that “[w]e eschew, therefore, any general attempt to state an operational criterion of the conduct conditions
of workable competition, and adhere in the main to a suggestion
only of structural conditions.”228 Beginning with this premise,
Bain attacked the conduct orientation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Under the statute, monopoly could be “attacked in the main
only indirectly through assault on the predatory or exclusionary
actions of firms, and not directly as a structural phenomenon
with certain undesirable consequences for market performance.”229 The result was “lengthy and expensive” and largely
indeterminate litigation, whose poor results were exacerbated by
the fact that the courts were usually “unwilling to remedy illegal
monopolization by requiring structural changes through such devices as dissolution or dismemberment of offending firms. Thus,
those revisions of market structure which might most strongly
assure a more competitive performance typically are not imposed . . . .”230
B. THE S-C-P PARADIGM AND THE COURTS
Under the influence of the S-C-P paradigm, the emergent
view came to be that antitrust policy prior to World War II had
been much too tolerant of anticompetitive industrial structures.
For example, Vanderbilt economist George W. Stocking faulted
the Supreme Court for an excessive emphasis on “intent and conduct,” which he believed had served to undermine several government cases against dominant firms.231 He was particularly
227. See id. at 236 (“[G]reat product differentiation is evidently one of several forces predisposing toward high seller concentration.”); see also id. at 416
(finding that high profit rates are correlated with high product differentiation,
tending “to cast a shadow of doubt on frequently repeated assertions that
strong product differentiation is conducive to a more workable competition”).
228. Id. at 427.
229. Id. at 607.
230. Id. at 608.
231. George W. Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and
Monopoly, 64 YALE L.J. 1107, 1124 (1955) (citing United States v. Winslow,
195 F. 578 (D. Mass. 1912), aff’d, 227 U.S. 202 (1913); United States v. Am.
Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D. Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921);
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. Int’l
Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927)). Stocking was best known for his coau-
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harsh in his treatment of the 1920 United States Steel decision,
which he believed “emasculated” the Sherman Act by refusing to
condemn an industrial combination unless it resulted in “complete” monopoly.232
The implications of the S-C-P paradigm on postwar antitrust
policy were far-reaching. In merger law, the paradigm entailed
that mergers could be analyzed simply by determining the market shares of the firms involved. This view came to be accepted by
the Supreme Court233 and was expressly incorporated into guidelines for assessing the legality of mergers that the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department issued in 1968, when Harvardtrained economist Donald F. Turner was its head.234 Mainly,
these guidelines created a sliding scale of enforcement policy depending on the market shares of the firms and the number of
firms in the market. The Supreme Court’s Philadelphia Bank decision created a virtual per se rule that linked merger legality to
the market shares of the merging firms.235
In monopolization law, the S-C-P paradigm shifted the focus
of analysis away from conduct, which had dominated the law in
the first half of the century,236 and toward structure. In the imthored book GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND
FREE ENTERPRISE (1951).
232. Stocking, supra note 231, at 1125.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277−78
(1966); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343 (1962). See also Stocking, supra
note 231, at 1110−13 (advocating the S-C-P paradigm and discussing it as a
standard applied in several major Supreme Court antitrust decisions).
234. The guidelines are still available on the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division website. See Merger Guidelines–1968, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
¶ 13,101, at 20,521 (1988), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/
11247.pdf. Turner received his Ph.D. from Harvard under Mason in 1947, and
then graduated from Yale Law School in 1950. He became head of the Antitrust Division in 1965, during the Johnson administration. The 1968 Guidelines were issued on his last day in office as Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice—In Perspective, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11257
.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
235. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 364.
236. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 86 (1911)
(holding that the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 prohibits all contracts and
combinations which amount to an unreasonable or undue restraint of trade in
interstate commerce); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181–83
(1911) (holding that the defendant’s “acts, contracts, agreements, [and] combinations” were of “such an unusual and wrongful character as to bring them
within the prohibitions of the law”); Am. Can Co., 230 F., at 902 (D. Md. 1916)
(arguing that the defendant, in its conduct, had for some time used its potentially harmful power for “weal rather than woe”).
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portant Alcoa237 and United Shoe Machinery238 decisions, the
courts condemned monopolists on the basis of minimal conduct
requirements when significant market power was clear.239 Indeed, the prominent judges in both decisions flirted briefly with
the idea that the mere existence of monopoly was sufficient to
warrant enforced dissolution.240 Writing in 1956, Turner concluded that “[s]uch postwar decisions as Alcoa perceptibly decreased the law’s requirement of bad conduct, perceptibly increased its attention to power, and substantially increased the
volume of discussion as to which course the law had best pursue.”241 In any event, he concluded, “Alcoa clearly consigned the
abuse theory of monopolization to limbo.”242
In 1959, while still a law professor, Turner and his coauthor
Carl Kaysen proposed that the government be permitted to break
up monopolies without any proof of anticompetitive conduct, but
based on structural criteria alone.243 That proposal was even extended to durable oligopolies.244 Twenty years later, in 1978,
Turner and his new coauthor and former student Phillip E. Areeda renewed the proposal that the government (but not private
plaintiffs) be permitted to bring dissolution decrees against durable monopolists.245 While the courts never adopted that position,
both the government and the courts accepted definitions of the
monopolization offense that required much less in the way of
237. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
238. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953).
239. Id. at 297–98; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 428; see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966) (condemning a series of acquisitions as
unlawful monopolization).
240. United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 348 (discussing but ultimately rejecting
the possibility of dissolution as a remedy); Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 428.
241. Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 281, 281–82 (1956).
242. Id. at 292.
243. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 46, 111–19 (1959).
244. See id. at 111; Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 655, 656 (1962).
245. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶¶ 614 –23
(1978). The present author has preserved the proposal, largely for its historical
value, in 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶¶ 630–38 (3d
ed. 2008).
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harmful conduct than earlier cases had found, provided that the
firm was properly found to be a structural monopolist. In sum,
the focus of monopolization law moved greatly from monopoly
conduct to monopoly market structure. In true Harvard School
fashion, evidence of subjective intent became formally irrelevant.246
The economists advocating the S-C-P paradigm and the
courts worked in tandem. Which one most influenced the other is
difficult to say. For example, the S-C-P paradigm matured in the
economics literature in the 1950s. However, the Alcoa decision
condemning the aluminum monopoly is almost pure structuralism, but was written nearly a decade earlier.247 Industrial structure was first and foremost on the minds of Congress when it
enacted the Cellar-Kefauver amendments to the merger law in
1950.248 The concerns that Bain expressed about a trend toward
increased industrial concentration showed up clearly in that statute’s legislative history.249 Indeed, they were a principal subject
of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study in 1948 that expressed alarm at the trend toward concentration:
No great stretch of the imagination is required to foresee that if nothing is done to check the growth in concentration, either the giant corporations will ultimately take over the country, or the Government
will be impelled to step in and impose some form of direct regulation
in the public interest.250

The FTC’s conclusions in part reflected views that stretched
back to at least 1932, when Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C.
Means criticized what they saw as rising concentration in their
246. See, e.g., Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945) (“We disregard any
question of ‘intent.’”). On the other side, in the du Pont (Cellophane) decision
the Supreme Court found substitutes for the defendant’s product and concluded that sufficient power was lacking. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956); see also Turner, supra note 244, at
281–82 (critiquing the “purpose and intent” approach).
247. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431.
248. See EDWARD S. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 371–81 (1957); Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and
the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 234 –36 (1960).
249. See Amending Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act: Hearings on H.R.
515 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 7
(1947) (statement of Kefauver that “[the] increased concentration of economic
power is dooming free enterprise”); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (describing Congress’s concern with “the protection of
competition, not competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations may tend to lessen competition”).
250. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT
68 (1948). The FTC’s conclusions were in fact strongly contested by economists. On this debate, see Bok, supra note 248, at 234 –35.
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famous book The Modern Corporation and Private Property.251
They spoke of the “centripetal attraction which draws wealth together into aggregations of constantly increasing size,” and
warned that “the trend is apparent” and “no limit is as yet in
sight.”252 The 1950 legislation followed a string of proposals in
Congress to stop further concentration.253 To be sure, these earlier proposals were not based on the full-blown S-C-P paradigm.
For the most part, they did not even share the basic concerns of
the structuralist economists about reduced output and higher
prices in concentrated industries. The earlier concerns were addressed mainly to aggregations of wealth or power as such, and
the economics that drove them was as much institutionalism as
neoclassicism.254 But whatever the source, the impetus for an antitrust policy concerned with industrial concentration was clear.
The S-C-P views on vertical integration were also reflected in
numerous antitrust decisions in the 1950s and 1960s that were
very harsh toward vertical expansion by virtually any means, including long-term contractual arrangements.255 This suspicion of
251. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).

C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-

252. Id. at 18.
253. See Note, Corporate Consolidation and the Concentration of Economic
Power: Proposals for Revitalization of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 57 YALE
L.J. 613, 620–26 (1948) (summarizing these proposals).
254. Derek Bok’s concluded:
To anyone used to the preoccupation of professors and administrators
with the economic consequences of monopoly power, the curious aspect of the debates is the paucity of remarks having to do with the effects of concentration on prices, innovation, distribution, and efficiency. To be sure, there were allusions to the need for preserving
competition. But competition appeared to possess a strong sociopolitical connotation which centered on the virtues of the small entrepreneur to an extent seldom duplicated in economic literature.
Bok, supra note 248, at 236–37; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and
the Merger of Law and Economics, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 515, 516 (1988).
255. E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (noting that not all vertical mergers are forbidden, only those whose effect is to
“substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . . tend to create a monopoly”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948) (finding that vertical merger “runs afoul of the Sherman Act if it was a calculated scheme to gain
control over an appreciable segment of the market and to restrain or suppress
competition, rather than an expansion to meet legitimate business needs”);
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947) (finding that illegal
restraint of trade “may result as readily from a conspiracy among those who
are affiliated or integrated under common ownership as from a conspiracy
among those who are otherwise independent”). But see United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 507–10 (1948) (refusing to condemn vertical
integration that left sufficient nonintegrated parties in the market). This case
was part of the motivation for Congress to pass the 1950 amendments.
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vertical integration was also reflected in congressional amendments to the merger law in 1950 that extended its coverage to
vertical mergers—that is, mergers between a customer and a
supplier. It also showed up in increasingly hostile attitudes toward long-term vertical contracts that were thought either to limit dealer freedom or to exclude rivals.256
VI. THE S-C-P PARADIGM IN DECLINE
The dominant theme guiding antitrust policy under the S-CP paradigm was that competition policy should eliminate or at
least reduce the amount of market power in the economy. Further, outside of monopolized industries the principal source of
market power was thought to be oligopoly, where the threats
were either Cournot-style behavior or express collusion.257
By contrast, the guiding principle of the Chicago School critique of the S-C-P paradigm was that market power is not inherently a bad thing. Indeed, often market power as well as high
concentration result from efficiency. To illustrate, suppose that
widgets are made in a moderately competitive market at a cost of
three dollars. If I develop a cost-reducing technology or process
that reduces my costs to two dollars but continue to sell my widgets at the market price, I will have high margins between my
prices and costs—something that the prevailing measures would
have identified as market power, as would accounting measures
of profits.258 Problematically, however, if I take advantage of my
cost-reducing technology to cut the widget price below three dollars, then I will be excluding my rivals. So, the critique ran, many
of the phenomena that the S-C-P paradigm had identified as anticompetitive market “foreclosure,” or the creation of barriers to
entry, were nothing more than economic efficiency.
256. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967)
(finding vertical territorial restraints to be per se unlawful); Simpson v. Union
Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 20–21 (1964) (holding that resale price maintenance enforced through consignment contracts imposed on dealers to be per se unlawful); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) (condemning
exclusive dealing on relatively low market shares where other oil refineries
were doing the same thing); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396
(1947) (tying of a staple commodity is unlawful even in the absence of proof of
serious market power).
257. See, e.g., KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 243, at 82.
258. For example, the Lerner Index, developed in the 1930s, expressed
market power as a relationship between price and marginal cost. See HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 3.1 (3d ed. 2005); Abba Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the
Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157, 169 (1934).
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A. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL REJECTION OF THE S-C-P PARADIGM
The Chicago School launched a frontal attack on the S-C-P
paradigm’s identification of industrial concentration as an inherent evil.259 The most likely cause of industrial concentration,
Chicago economists argued, was economies of scale.260 Further,
the engineering studies of production that S-C-P economists had
used to measure economies of scale vastly understated them.261
The fairly rigid Cournot-based and monopolistic theories that the
S-C-P paradigm adopted to account for behavior in concentrated
markets considerably understated the ingenuity of firms in finding ways to compete.262 Or to state it more technically, the S-C-P
paradigm tended to view oligopoly as a structural problem in the
Cournot sense, which rather strictly related performance to the
number of firms in a market and their size distribution.263 In contrast, the Chicago School tended to look at concentrated industries as presenting a problem in price theory,264 in which each
market participant weighed the net effects of various actions and
anticipated responses.265 To be sure, the number of firms was not
unimportant—at least at very low levels—but it was hardly deci259. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 31–42 (discussing the initial differences and subsequent coalescence of the two schools). See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 330–48 (1995) (recounting the
Chicago School’s development). Many members of the Chicago School began in
the Harvard camp and migrated toward the Chicago position. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 319 n.14; GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 97–100 (1988); Posner, supra note 157, at 933–35. See
generally William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix,
2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (discussing the intermingling of economic theories
between the two schools). At the same time, however, the Harvard School
largely abandoned the S-C-P paradigm. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 35–
38. Government officials eventually solicited these academic theories to help
develop antitrust policy. See Hovenkamp, supra note 199, at 217–18.
260. See Sam Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20 J.L. & ECON. 229, 229 (1977) (“[M]arket concentration and industry
profitability are positively correlated.”).
261. See generally id. at 229–30 (examining market structure and pricing);
Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974)
(comparing different methods of analyzing industrial concentration).
262. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 35–37 (explaining Cournot’s theory
and the S-C-P paradigm).
263. See id.
264. See Posner, supra note 157, at 931–32.
265. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44
(1964), reprinted in GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 39–
63 (1968) (discussing the effects of collusion and price-cutting); Posner, supra
note 157, at 931–32.
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sive.266 Collusion was often a possibility. The price theory perspective revealed the extent to which a firm’s strategies depended
not only on the number of firms, but also on such things as product differentiation and the amount of price information available
in the market. The Chicago theory also rejected the purely structuralist notion that the oligopoly demand curve contained a
“kink” that inclined fellow oligopolists to follow a price increase
but not a price cut.267 Indeed, in orthodox Chicago folklore the
“kinky demand curve” became something of a joke about structuralism run amuck.268
The Chicago School also rejected the Bainian theory of entry
barriers,269 which defined them as any market factor that excluded entry while the firms already in the market were earning
returns above the competitive level.270 Under this definition both
scale economies and product differentiation were entry barriers,
because each gave incumbent firms advantages over new entrants.271 The Chicago view was that this definition penalized
firms for being innovative and efficient, particularly if high entry
barriers were used as a justification for government intervention.272 Rather, George J. Stigler argued, an entry barrier must
be some factor that new rivals must overcome and that established firms did not need to overcome when they entered the
market.273
266. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 32 (discussing the Chicago viewpoint on the relationship between effective competition and the number of
firms involved).
267. Cf. George J. Stigler, The Kinky Oligopoly Demand and Rigid Prices,
55 J. POL. ECON. 432, 434 –48 (1947) (examining the concept of the kinky demand curve). The notion of the kinky demand curve was formulated by Harvard professor Paul Sweezy and Oxford economists Robert L. Hall and Charles
J. Hitch. Id. at 432; see R.L. Hall & C.J. Hitch, Price Theory and Business Behaviour, 2 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 12, 12–20 (1939); Paul M. Sweezy, Demand
Under Conditions of Oligopoly, 47 J. POL. ECON. 568, 570–75 (1939).
268. See generally George J. Stigler, The Literature of Economics: The Case
of the Kinked Oligopoly Demand Curve, 16 ECON. INQUIRY 185, 188–94 (1978)
(discussing the history of the kinky demand curve from the perspective of a
biased participant).
269. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 102–03 (explaining Stigler’s alternative definition of barriers to entry).
270. See Bain, Conditions of Entry, supra note 206, at 4 –5 (defining conditions of entry).
271. See id. at 14 (discussing the attributes of heightened conditions of entry).
272. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 33 (noting the Chicago School’s disapproval of government intervention in markets).
273. See Stigler, supra note 265, at 67. Antitrust policy today continues to
use mainly the Bainian definition of barriers to entry. See 2B PHILLIP E.
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The twin pillars of Chicago School revisionism were first,
that attainment of economies of scale required firms much larger
than Bain had supposed; and second, that firms in concentrated
markets behave much more competitively than Chamberlin, Mason, Bain, Kaysen, or Turner had supposed—at least down to the
point at which the market contains only three or four firms.274
B. REJECTION OF THE LEVERAGING THEORY OF MONOPOLY
POWER
There were other important critiques as well. One of the
most important was the 1950s critique of the “migration” or “domino” theory of monopoly, which was that a monopolist could use
monopoly power in one market to leverage a second monopoly
somewhere else.275 The theory was thoroughly embraced by the
Supreme Court.276 Some Chicago School critics ascribed the
theory to the Harvard School and the S-C-P paradigm, although
without good foundation.277
The leveraging theory of monopoly had many manifestations,
but they all involved the dominant firm’s related operations in
two different markets.278 If the markets were vertically related,
then vertical integration became the problem;279 however, leveraging applied in other pairings of markets as well. The thinking
was that a firm that operated in two or more markets—and had
market power in one of them—might use that power to create a
second monopoly or reap an unfair competitive advantage in the
second market.280 The theory showed up in antitrust law in the
AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 420(a) (3d ed. 2007).
274. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and
Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1973) (concluding that industrial concentration largely results from changing cost conditions, rather than heightened
entry barriers); Wesley J. Liebeler, Market Power and Competitive Superiority
in Concentrated Industries, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1231, 1232–34 (1978) (arguing
against restrictions on competitive superiority).
275. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 297 (applying the leverage
theory to the computer industry).
276. See id. at 201 (noting the Court’s articulation of the leverage theory).
277. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 157, at 929 (characterizing various members of the Harvard School, including Donald Turner, as embracing the leverage theory). In fact, Turner’s concern is focused on rivals in the tied product
markets, rather than theories of multiple monopoly profits. See Donald F.
Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72
HARV. L. REV. 50, 60–62, 63 n.42 (1958).
278. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 201 (discussing the orthodox leverage theory).
279. See id. at 33 (discussing leverage theory and vertical integration).
280. See id. at 201.
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1911 Standard Oil case, in the claim that Rockefeller’s Standard
Oil Company continuously enlarged its monopoly by using monopoly profits in towns where it was already dominant in order to
finance predatory pricing in towns where it had not yet attained
such power.281 That theory was embraced by Congress in 1914,
when the original section 2 of the Clayton Act made it unlawful
for a firm to charge a low price in a targeted community while
selling similar goods at a higher price elsewhere.282 Another manifestation of monopoly leveraging was the notion that a firm
that operated in many markets but had a monopoly in only a few
might use multimarket contracting to leverage additional advantage in its non-monopoly markets.283 This view was advocated by
the Antitrust Division284 and embraced by the Supreme Court in
its 1948 Griffith decision, which condemned a large motion picture exhibitor’s practice of negotiating film contracts for all of its
theaters together, thus obtaining “unfair” advantages in towns
where it lacked power.285
Undoubtedly the most important debate over leveraging occurred in the law of tying arrangements,286 although the origins
281. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31–44 (1911) (analyzing allegations against Standard Oil). For the Chicago School critique, see
John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L.
& ECON. 137, 137–43 (1958), which disputes the theory that Standard Oil even
engaged in predatory pricing. See generally James May, The Story of Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, in ANTITRUST STORIES, supra note 181, at 7 (detailing the Standard Oil litigation). McGee’s theory itself is subject to some criticism. See James A. Dalton & Louis Esposito, Predatory Price Cutting and
Standard Oil: A Re-examination of the Trial Record, 22 RES. L. & ECON. 155,
156–58 (2007) (reexamining the trial record and finding numerous instances of
predation, in conflict with McGee’s conclusions); Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case,
39 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3–6 (1996) (using exclusionary contracts to impose higher
costs); cf. RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 113–
17, 144 –47, 202–25, 251–58 (1998) (finding anticompetitive agreements with
railroads). The leverage theory of predatory pricing antedates the passage of
the Sherman Act. See F.J. Stimson, “Trusts,” 1 HARV. L. REV. 132, 134 (1887)
(arguing that monopoly prices in monopoly towns could subsidize predatory
pricing in competitive towns, creating a monopoly in them as well).
282. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, 730–31 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2006)); cf. 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 745 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing price predation and the
Robinson-Patman Act).
283. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 245, ¶ 652(a).
284. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 102–04 (1948).
285. See id. at 109.
286. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (manuscript at 1–3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345239) (arguing against
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long antedate the antitrust laws.287 The idea was that by tying
separate goods or transactions together the owner of a monopoly
could obtain multiple sets of monopoly markups.288 The idea originated in patent law in response to attempts by patentees to impose post-sale restraints on patented articles.289 The Supreme
Court responded with the “first sale” doctrine, which holds that
once a patented article is sold, the patentee loses all control over
it and cannot impose further restrictions or collect additional
royalties on downstream sales.290 Speaking through Chief Justice
Taney, the Supreme Court embraced the doctrine in its first
Bloomer decision in 1852.291 In litigation involving the same patent a decade later, the Court elaborated, stating that patentees
“are entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine.”292 As a
result, when the patentee has sold the patented article he has
“parted with his monopoly, and ceased to have any interest whatever in the machine.”293 Justice Brandeis picked this idea up
eighty years later in the Carbice decision, which found unlawful
patent “misuse” in a patentee’s contractual requirement that
purchasers of its patented ice box purchase only its own dry ice,
which was the refrigerant.294 This arrangement, Brandeis opined,
the leverage critique and concluding that many ties are anticompetitive); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and § 2 of the Sherman Act, 90
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 10), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/communications/documents/BrodleySymp
Hovenkamp.pdf (showing that most price discrimination ties benefit consumers).
287. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 30 (1957) (“The relationship of tying to creation of monopoly—the leverage problem—had been faced by courts . . . before the passage
of the Clayton Act.”).
288. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 201.
289. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 287, at 30 (citing several pertinent cases).
290. See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852)
(“And when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer
within the limits of the monopoly.”).
291. See id. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). See generally Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Evolution of IP/Competition Policy: The First Sale Rule and Vertical Restraints, in CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: COMPETITION POLICY IN INNOVATION INTENSIVE MARKETS (forthcoming 2010, on file with author) (examining the historical development of the
first sale doctrine and its relationship with competition policy).
292. See Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 350 (1863).
293. Id.
294. See Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 29–32
(1931).
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enabled the patent owner to “derive its profit, not from the invention on which the law gives it a monopoly, but from the unpatented supplies with which it is used.”295 If a monopoly could be
contractually expanded in this way a patentee “might conceivably
monopolize the commerce in a large part of unpatented materials
used in its manufacture. The owner of a patent for a machine
might thereby secure a partial monopoly on the unpatented supplies consumed in its operation.”296
The first critique of this theory did not come from the Chicago School at all, but rather from Myron W. Watkins, a professor
at New York University, who observed that a monopolist could
charge a high price for the second product only by offering a compensating price reduction in the first product.297 That is, a monopoly creates the opportunity for a single monopoly markup, and a
buyer will simply attribute a price increase in a tied product to
the monopoly product itself.298 The critique was famously elaborated upon by Ward Bowman in 1957,299 and since that time has
been considered a core principle of the Chicago School critique of
the Harvard School.300
The leverage theory was clearly part of the economic folklore
of the Supreme Court, and it accounts for a good deal of the
Court’s hostility toward a variety of practices.301 Among these
were the per se antitrust rule against tying arrangements, developed in the 1940s and 1950s.302 The leverage theory also accounts
for much of the Supreme Court’s hostility toward vertical integra-

295. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917)).
296. Id. at 32.
297. Cf. MYRON W. WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 221 (3d ed. 1940) (noting that tied products
subject to free competition “would not normally be profitable”).
298. See id. at 220 (arguing that price increases may be justified by the
“close technical interrelationship between the two articles or machines”).
299. See generally Bowman, supra note 287, at 19–36 (analyzing the rationales for tying).
300. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 157, at 925–26 (listing explosion of the
leverage theory for tying as the first hallmark of the Chicago approach to antitrust theory).
301. Cf. 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶¶ 1700–01 (2d ed. 2004) (noting the presence of leveraging arguments in the
case law condemning ties).
302. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1958); TimesPicayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 (1953); Int’l Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (holding that a monopoly’s foreclosure
of competition through tying arrangements may be per se unreasonable).
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tion, which it viewed as a way of spreading monopoly vertically.303
In fact, the leveraging theory never held a secure place in either the writings of Harvard School economists and lawyers or in
the S-C-P paradigm generally. When the writers representing the
S-C-P paradigm spoke of tying, vertical integration, or other monopoly extensions, the stated concern was not the leveraging of
additional profits but rather “foreclosure,”304 another concept that
produced considerable controversy with the Chicago School but
which nevertheless remains a much more viable topic of debate.
For Bain, Kaysen, and Turner in the 1950s, and Areeda and
Turner in the 1970s, the real concern that arose from the monopolist’s operations in a second market was that the firm would be
able to deny market access to rivals.305 This view remains viable
as a matter of legal policy to this day—for example, in the condemnation of Microsoft for tying Internet Explorer to its Windows
operating system in order to deny market access to rival internet
browser Netscape.306
CONCLUSION
The Harvard School abandoned most parts of the S-C-P paradigm in the 1970s, and since then Chicago and Harvard positions on competition policy have converged on most, but not all,
issues. For example, Areeda and Turner completely accepted the
Chicago School critique of the leverage theory in the first edition
of their treatise on antitrust law.307 A further post-Chicago critique has also emerged. Sometimes known as the new industrial
economics,308 it uses the mathematics of marginalism and game
theory in a highly technical fashion, in many cases far beyond the
ability of any court to administer in the context of legal regula303. See Robert Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal
History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 157–58 (1954)
(“[T]he recent attacks upon vertical integration are not something new in the
law.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 7–9 (explaining the development of legal
policies aimed at vertical integration).
304. Cf. KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 243, at 157 (discussing tying and
entry barriers).
305. See Turner, supra note 244, at 656.
306. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85–95 (D.C. Cir.
2001); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 245, ¶ 617 (examining the Microsoft issues).
307. Cf. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 245, ¶ 347 (discussing tying and
damages).
308. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
333–36 (1988).
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tion. One consequence is that while antitrust policy is far more
sophisticated in its use of economics than it was a half century
ago, the gap between high economic theory and antitrust practice
is larger than it has ever been.
The marginalist revolution completely revised our understanding of economic competition. Neoclassicism substituted a
reasonably strong classical consensus with a complex variety of
theories about how competition works. Along with this came an
increasing belief that markets differ from one another much more
than the classicists had believed. Accommodating these changes
to competition policy has taken more than a century. In the
process we have developed a set of complex antitrust rules and a
corresponding awareness of the need for simplifying assumptions. While neoclassicism taught us that deviations from perfect
competition are much more common than we once believed, it also instilled a firm recognition that some deviations must simply
be tolerated.

